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ABSTRACT
Previous researchers of the concept of animism, the 
attribution of life to non-living objects, have been 
theoretically "divided on the issue of whether animistic 
throught is a useful description of the development of 
cognition in the child. Huang, Deutsch, and others con­
tend that animistic type responses found by Piaget, 
Russell and Dennis, and associates, were but an artifact 
of the experimental conditions of asking leading and 
suggesting questions. Three tasks were devised for the 
present research which differed in the degree of abstrac­
tion inherent in the stimulus item. Sixty subjects, 
ages 3, 4, and 5, were tested individually using a verbal 
questionnaire, a pictorial card sort task, and a story 
inquiry task involving scaled-model objects. In each 
situation Ss were asked specifically if objects were 
alive or not alive.
It was hypothesized that differences in the amount 
of animism on the 3 tasks would support the notion that a 
child's thought is quantitatively rather than qualita­
tively different from that of an adult. Results from the 
present study indicate that Ss were consistent in 
attributing or denying life to a majority of items on 
paired tests. This lends credence to the notion that
viii
young children's responses are not task specific.
Animism scores were calculated for each task by counting 
the number of times £3 called an inanimate object alive. 
These scores were found to be significantly correlated 
for all Ss. Judges were able to reliably classify 
Questionnaire protocols into one of four stages of animism 
as defined by Laurendeau and Pinard (1962). The cri­
teria for stages were also applied to the Card Sort task, 
with a close correspondence exhibited between those and 
the stages on the Questionnaire.
Evidence bearing on the developmental aspect of 
animism generally supports Piaget's original formulation 
of 4 stages. Sex was found to be non-contributory in 
accounting for the variance in scores, whereas age was 
found to be highly significant. With increasing age,
Ss were found to be less animistic, more consistent in 
their judgments, less dominated by whether an object was 
able to move in assessing aliveness, and more willing to 
grant anthropomorphic traits without also granting alive­
ness to inanimate objects. Some findings indicate, 
however, that the conceptual levels of all subjects are 
still in a transitional stage of development. A few 
living objects with which Ss probably had had a great 
deal of experience were highly unreliable in eliciting 
consistent responses across tasks. Plant life was often 
denied life, even by the older Ss. Objects involved in an
objectively accidental situation were often blamed for 
what happened; even though intent was denied, £s of all 
ages frequently said that objects should be punished.
Subjects seldom used superficial characteristics 
of an object to explain why they called it alive or not. 
Functional qualities were employed most often. The 
latter explanations sometimes revealed moralistic 
opinions about the usefulness of objects, illustrating the 
tendency toward egocentricity in children's thinking.
In summary, with the utilization of 3 experimental 
tasks judged to be reliable and valid in the measure­
ment of animism, young children in the current study were 
found to exhibit varying degrees of animism. A remark­
able intra-subject consistency prevailed across tasks, 
yielding a picture of strongly-held beliefs about animism 
in a developmental sequence.
x
INTRODUCTION
"At every stage there remain in the conception of 
nature what we might call 'adherences', fragments of inter­
nal experience which still cling to the external world" 
(Piaget, 1930, p. 244). Animism is one way the child, in 
his immature state of cognitive development, expresses 
such adherences. In order to gain an appreciation of the 
complexities involved in the scientific investigation of 
animism, the following discussion will outline three major 
areas of concern. First, the definition of animism, in­
cluding early philosophical thinking, Piaget's formulation, 
and usages of the term in anthropology, psychiatry, and 
psychology. Second, theoretical considerations in the 
study of animism, including the concept as being exclusively 
infantile, the effect of experience on animism, and the 
concept of stages of animistic thinking. And third, meth- 
ological problems, including a discussion of methods 
utilized to study animism, the factors affecting animism 
in test situations, and the techniques of data analysis. 
Most of this discussion relates research findings to 
Piaget's theory, his being the initial systematic formula­
tion of the concept of animism.
1
Animism Defined
Even a cursory reading of the literature on animism 
reveals a lack of uniform definitions of animism. This 
problem is further complicated by the difficulty in 
interpreting behavior as evidence for the presence or ab­
sence of animism, an inferential judgment.
Piaget1s Theory
The writer initially conceived of animism as the at­
tribution of animate qualities to inanimate objects. Most 
experimenters, however, have pressed this to the logical 
conclusion of attributing "life" to inanimate things.
Even Jean Piaget, the pioneer in this field as in so many 
others in child development, calls animism "the tendency 
among children to consider things as living and conscious" 
(1933, p. 380). For Piaget, animism is classified as one 
of the 17 types of explanations of causality by children 
of all ages. It is grouped with other prelogical and 
egocentric types, given by children up to 7 or 8 years of 
age.
Piaget's theory of the origin of child animism in­
cludes the notions of indissociation and introjection.
The former term refers to the continuum of psychical and 
physical features which are not discriminated in the "prim­
itive consciousness". It is this quality which accounts 
for diffuse animism, the general tendency of children to 
confuse the living and the inert. Introjection, caused by
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the egocentricity of the child, is the tendency to situate 
in objects or others the reciprocal feelings to those the 
child experiences from their contact. This action under­
lies systematic animism, or the explicit animistic beliefs 
held by the child. Piaget explains that the thinking of 
the child changes through a dissociation of the physical 
and psychial characteristics of things. That is, as the 
child becomes aware of his self and his own thoughts, he 
denies awareness and thought in objects. "In short, the 
dissociation of ideas arises from the growth of the con­
sciousness of self" (1929, p. 239).
An important feature of the child's thought is that 
objects act intentionally. A child at this stage of cog­
nitive development cannot conceive of action without 
consciousness. Because he is egocentric he is unable to 
arrive at an objective or impersonal judgment of events. 
Therefore, an object which provokes pain or fear is seen 
as doing this intentionally. In support of this egocen­
tricity Piaget cites the reaction children typically have 
with regard to their relationship to the moon: the child
will say with conviction that the moon follows them where 
ever they go. A 4-year-old child told the author that the 
moon follows her and no one else, not even her partents 
or sister.
Piaget has enumerated a series of stages of animism.
In the first stage, the child attributes life to usefulness 
or activity in general. In the next stage life is
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attributed only to things which move. The third stage is 
characterized by calling those things alive which move 
spontaneously. Finally, the fourth stage restricts life 
to animals and plants. Piaget assigned approximate age 
ranges for each of these stages: Stage One from 4 to 6
years, Stage Two, 6 to 7, Stage Three, 8 to 10, and Stage 
Four, 11 and over.
Earlier Investigators View Animism
Although Piaget may have been the first to systematic­
ally investigate animism, Dennis (19 38) reviewed earlier 
thoughts on the subject. Writing in the Natural History of 
Religion, Hume said "there is a universal tendency among 
mankind to conceive all beings like themselves, and to 
transfer to every object those qualities with which they 
are familiarly acquainted, and of which they are intimately 
conscious" (1854, p. 429). Likewise, Tiedemann held that 
the animistic tendency ". . . is certainly due to the fact 
that one always envisages an unknown thing through one 
that is known” (Murchison & Lager, 1927, p. 229). Other 
examples are given by Dennis, including Comte's proposal 
that the earliest forms of religion were based upon " . . .  
that tendency of our nature by which Man conceives all 
external bodies as animated by a life analogous to his 
own" (1830, p. 155).
Spontaneous Animism.
Instances of spontaneous animism are numerous. There 
are biographical studies prior to Piaget which attest to
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the ubiquitous nature of this quality. Tiedemann wrote 
of his son's comments: "The sun has gone to bed, tomorrow
he will get up again, drink his tea and eat his bread and 
butter" (Murchison & Langer, 1927, p. 229). Dennis (1938) 
notes a list of more than 50 biographies containing 
records of children humanizing objects. Dennis (1942) 
wrote observations of his own daughter, of whom he asked 
virtually all of Piaget's standard questions. She respond­
ed with answers very similar to those of Piaget's subjects.
These records of spontaneous animistic thought are 
very important in the light of criticism leveled by some 
who say that it is only the contrived, artificial experi­
mental situation which produces this tendency, and that 
the child is pushed by force of suggestion to answer in 
such a manner. Any close observer of children can see 
incidences of animism, many of which are clearly not part 
of mere playful fantasy. The author's daughter, at the 
age of 2 years and 4 months, retrieved a favored blanket 
from under a chair with the comment, "My mike (blanket) 
watch t.v., too."
Use of Animism in Psychology Vis a Vis Anthropology
An important distinction must be drawn between how 
the term "animism" has been used traditionally by psycho­
logy and anthropology. E. B. Tylor (1888) was one of the 
primary forces in defining animism as the granting of 
souls or spirits to objects, this being the usage of the 
term in anthropology. Tylor conceived of this process
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as primitive man's grappling with the facts of trances, 
dreams, visions, sleep, and so forth. "Animatism", on the 
other hand, is used in anthropology as endowing objects 
with life or vitality. Thus, "animism" to the psychologist 
is "animatism" to the anthropologist. Werner and Carrison 
(1944) and Klingberg (1957) were careful to make this dis­
tinction, neglected by a majority of the writers. Safier 
(1964), however, pointed out how the early anthropological 
use of animism implied a distinction between object and 
object, between body and soul. Piaget's theory holds that 
animism does not arise through a separation of object and 
subject, but through a fusion of the two.
Piaget recognized that the term "animism" had been 
used by English anthropologists to "describe those beliefs 
according to which primitive peoples endow nature with 
'souls', 'spirits', etc. in order to explain physical 
phenomena" (1929, p. 169). Levy-Bruhl and others, Piaget 
continues, have shown that the processes of the primitive 
mind are much different from this. The primitive mind 
does not distinguish mind from matter, and thus they endow 
things with both material properties and with will. Piaget 
says he does not mean to imply that child animism and 
similar beliefs in primitive peoples have the same meaning 
and psychological origins. He is using the term in a 
generic sense to refer to the tendency of the child to 
ascribe life and consciousness to non-living things.
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Tynni (1958) confuses the issue by calling animism 
"the tendency to attribute life or consciousness to in­
animate objects or to explain natural phenomena in terms 
of animate forces" (1958, p. 21), thus combining the two 
usages. A misunderstanding of the term has led several 
investigators to challenge the results of others while 
lacking precise knowledge of how the concept is being 
defined (e.g., Lowrie, 1954).
Psychoanalytic Usage.
Psychoanalytic literature on animism refers to the 
child's psychological closeness to animals. Freud had a 
great interest in the animal fantasies of children and 
was impressed by the fact that children do not discrimi­
nate sharply between animals and humans. "Children have 
no scruples over allowing animals to rank as their full 
equals. Uninhibited as they are in the avowal of their 
bodily needs, they no doubt feel themselves more akin to 
animals than to their elders, who may well be a puzzle to 
them" (Freud, 1950, p. 127). Some would argue that child­
ren 's books, songs, and toys which portray animals behav­
ing as humans influence the child in this regard. In a 
sense, Freud contradicted himself in saying that children 
do not discriminate between animals and humans, and then 
remarking that children feel more closely related to ani­
mals than to adult humans. For Freud, the mechanism which 
accounts for animism is projection. Piaget argues that 
mere projection, or introjection in his scheme, is
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inadequate to describe animism without the additional 
notion of indissociation, whereby the child does not sepa­
rate psychical from physical and attributes "to things not 
only what belongs to us . . . but also characteristics re­
ciprocal to our own— malice when we are afraid, obedience 
when we command, . . . etc." (Piaget, 1929, p. 244).
In an effort to study experimentally the effect of 
animal vs. human stimuli in a story-telling task, several 
investigators presented children two sets of picture cards, 
one set with human characters and one with animals. Al­
though the studies varied in terms of stimuli and experi­
mental precision, the results generally indicated no 
difference in the stories told with regard to length, com­
plexity, clinical usefulness, or other qualitative features 
(Biersdorf & Marcuse, 1953; Bills, 1950, Bills, et al., 
1950; Budoff, 1960). There is some evidence that children 
in the upper primary grades (age 8 and above) identify more 
with human pictures (Light, 1954; Boyd & Mandler, 1955), 
but there seems no marked favor of animal pictures at the 
younger age leves. These results would seem to support 
Piaget's indissociation theory rather than the Freudian 
mechanism of projection whereby the child should favor 
animals as a vehicle for expressing needs, fears, and other 
motives.
Two Views of Animism in Psychology
The psychological literature contains basically 2 
groups representing what might be termed "positive" and
"negative" approaches. The first describes animism as the 
result of the immature development of the child's thought, 
a qualitatively different process from adult logic. The 
second group holds that there is no such thing as pre- 
causal or prelogical thought and that the only difference 
between child and adult thought is in the amount of know­
ledge accrued. Members of the "positive" group proclaim 
the existence of animism, while those of the "negative" 
stance deny it.
There is argument concerning the nature of the initial 
stage of development of child thought. Huang and his 
associates, for example, prefer to describe the situation 
as one in which the child begins in a neutral and indeter­
minate state, which is neither animism nor physicalism, 
and then proceeds by the process of differentiation to the 
adult state of causality, i.e., physicalism. Klingberg 
has rephrased this by saying that "growth goes from ignor­
ance to better and better knowledge" (1957, p. 236).
Jahoda points out that what "Piaget attempted to do was to 
show that what in the past had been taken as mere ignor­
ance was in fact a reflection, in a variety of spheres, 
of the immature state of mental development of the child" 
(1958a, p. 204).
In the above discussion of the usage of the term 
"animism" the reader no doubt got a glimpse of the com­
plexity of the issues. The very existence of the behavior 
is challenged, as is the reality of precausal thinking in
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general. The purpose of the present research is not to 
settle the latter issue, but rather to investigate further 
the facets of animism in children. A working operational 
definition of the term animism for the present study will 
be those instances of child behavior, both verbal and non­
verbal, in which the child attributes to non-living ob­
jects characteristics not typically given them by educated 
adults of the same culture. This would include the attri­
bution of "life" and the endowment of characteristics more 
specific in nature, such as moving, making noise, and 
feeling.
Theoretical Issues in the Study of Animism
Jahoda (1958a), Laurendeau and Pinard (1962), and 
Looft and Bartz (1969) all discussed critically the theoreti­
cal and methodological divergences occurring in the vast 
array of studies on animism. While Jahoda (1958a) was 
primarily concerned with accounting for cross-cultural 
variations, the latter two researchers attempted to ferret 
out the more subtle sources of disagreement. The following 
paragraphs will briefly review these issues together with 
previous findings in the area of animism research.
The measurement of animism is at first glance an almost 
impossible task. It requires the reflections of thought 
processes from subjects sometimes too young for direct 
confrontation.
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Animism as an Infantile Concept
Studies of animism have been conducted on Ss of all 
ages, although a majority have centered on school aged 
children, from about 5 to 12 years old. This possibly 
would be beyond the age of "diffuse animism" as delineated 
by Piaget and into the period of "systematic animism", 
more influenced by social, cultural, and intra-individual 
factors. At virtually every age level there are both 
substantiating and refuting studies with regard to Piaget's 
model of animistic thought.
Piaget's subjects were all children, and therefore he 
spoke of "child animism". Some criticize him for assuming 
that animism is present only in the young. Several studies 
conducted on college students reveal that some animistic 
responses are obtained even from those with a course in 
biology (Dennis, 1953; Crannell, 1954; Bell, 1954; Voeks, 
1954; Crowell & Dole, 1957; Dennis, 1957; Simmons & Gross, 
1957). In an investigation including £s from 70 to 90 
years of age, Dennis and Mallinger (1949) found a surpris­
ing amount of animism.
The Effect of Specific Experiences on Animism
Cross-cultural research on animism is of particular 
importance in the light of long-standing debate over 
whether the civilized child's mind is equivalent to the 
mind of primitive man. Comte, is his treatise on religion, 
spoke of animism in children being like that found in 
primitives and even in infra-human primates. He illustrated
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his convictions by claiming that a monkey, a child, and 
a primitive man would all react in a similar way when 
confronted with a watch, only their form of expression 
differing.
Levy-Bruhl likewise asserted that primitive mentality 
is mystical, precausal, and prelogical— qualitatively dif­
ferent from civilized man (1923, 1926). Huang (1943) 
mentions that both H. Werner and C. Raspe draw a close 
parallelism between the mind of a child and that of primi­
tive peoples. Huang points out that the evidence for such 
a relationship is typically speculative and anecdotal. He 
challenges the possibility that a child thinks exclusively 
in animistic terms across varying conditions.
Klingberg (1957) set out to determine if the animistic 
tendency is based upon a primitive mental structure as 
hypothesized by Piaget. The author notes that Piaget was 
influenced by Levy-Bruhl and "genetic parallels", based 
on the recapitualtion theory. Since the idea of the 
primitive mentality of uncivilized man has been discarded 
in ethnology, Klingberg suggests that this constitutes an 
error in reasoning by Piaget. He concludes by admitting 
that children often attribute life to certain non-living 
objects, but says that Piaget's hypothesis is untenable 
because of faulty logic and further that it cannot be 
tested by empirical means.
Mead (19 32) formulated the problem this way: "Was
the thought of primitive children characterized by the
13
type of animistic premise, anthropomorphic interpretation 
and faulty logic, which had been recorded for civilized 
children, or was this type of thought a product of special 
social environment?" (Mead, 1932, p. 174). In her study 
of Manus children she found no evidence of "spontaneous 
animism" and concluded that animistic thought cannot be 
explained in terms of intellectual immaturity. She con­
cluded that this tendency must be culturally determined 
rather than an inevitable concomitant of a particular stage 
of mental development. It must be recognized, however, 
that Mead's methods were very different from Piaget's and 
others investigating this area.
Some support for Mead's contention that animism is 
wholly determined by cultural influences is found in the 
results of a study involving American school children. 
Johnson and Josey (1931-32), using Piaget's method without 
change, could not duplicate the results found with Swiss 
and French children. One of their explanations was that 
the English language was superior to the French as an 
instrument for logical thinking.
In a comprehensive review of cross-cultural research 
on animism, Jahoda (1958a) covers studies done on white 
American children (Lerner, 1937; Deutsche, 1937; Russell, 
1940a, 1942) , Hopi and Zuni Indian children (Dennis & 
Russell, 1940; Dennis, 1943; Havighurst & Neugarten, 1955), 
Chinese children (Huang, Chen & Yang, 19 35; Huang & Lee, 
1945), European children (Askar, 1932; Klingberg, 1957),
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and the Manus children of New Guinea (Mead, 1932). Jahoda 
admits that at first impression the reader is struck by 
the absence of consistent trends. He then reviews Piaget's 
theory, with regard to diffuse and systematic animism 
with special emphasis on social factors which Piaget sug­
gested would favor the persistence of animism. These fac­
tors included (1) feelings of participation, (2) feelings 
of moral obligation, and (3) the language itself. It is 
easy to conjecture how various cultures would differentially 
reinforce animism, and thus cross-cultural uniformity of 
animistic responses could not be anticipated following the 
age of diffuse animism, ending about 5 years of age. In 
a study of animism with children of West Africa, Jahoda 
(1958b) discussed some subtle cultural factors which might 
explain the low incidences of animism found.
Looft and Bartz (1969) reviewed some empirical evi­
dence both supporting and refuting the notion that environ­
mental influences largely determine the presence of animism. 
Ezer (1962) found that children from more religious homes 
tended to give more precausal explanations. Dennis (1942) 
and Tynni (1958), however, cite results which reject the 
hypothesis that animism is transmitted from parent to off­
spring in the "teaching process". It would seem that blind 
adherence to either extreme of the nature-nurture continuum 
would lead to a vunerable theoretical position.
Piaget demonstrated that even when the relevant facts 
are disclosed to the child that he will not be swayed from
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his opinions (1929, p. 175). Contrary to these observa­
tions, however, are the results of Looft and Charles 
(1969). These authors found marked alternation of the 
life concept in some 8-year-old children after being shown 
a movie on the biological criteria for living as opposed 
to non-living things. It seems to this writer that older 
children may be "prepared" to assimilate such information 
whereas younger Ss may not show such marked change. It 
could be further postulated that if the presentation of 
of such information could be on the child's level, whatever 
age that may be, that a significant change may take place.
The Stage Concept of Animism
There has been much theoretical debate regarding the 
validity of a stage concept, i.e., whether growth is con­
tinuous or discontinuous. Without dwelling on the specu­
lative discussions, suffice it to say that if growth occurs, 
it may be described in a series of stages. Piaget assigned 
age limits for each of his stages of animism. Nearly every 
investigator has taken him to task on this point, although 
he had warned that:
There is no fully consistent age progression; 
development may fluctuate with regressions and 
jumps (p. 190); some children aged between five 
and six exhibit hardly any animism (p. 178) 
whilst much older ones may do so (1929, p. 218).
And, further, he said that "We should not dream of guaran­
teeing the soundness of the present technique as a means 
of individual diagnosis" (1929, pp. 188-189).
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For Piaget, however, the stage concept is more than 
a simplified description of the growth process. It is not 
merely that growth occurs, but rather that notions about 
the world are learned by the child which replace the 
former concepts. Thus, child thought differs qualita­
tively from adult thinking. The concepts of filiation 
and substitution are employed by Laurendeau and Pinard 
(1962) to describe the progression from prelogical to 
causative thinking. Two performances hold a relation of 
filiation when they have common characteristics and when 
the superior performance derives from the preceding through 
a process of transformation. This transformation implies 
an integration of the inferior performance into the supe­
rior. On the other hand, development occurs through sub­
stitution when subsequent performances simply replace 
antecedent performances, this process being gradual and 
with an intermediate stage of the two overlapping. The 
authors further state that the child's causal thinking 
seems to develop through substitution rather than filiation. 
Laurendeau and Pinard (1962) were able to reliably 
classify 500 Ss into 4 stages of animism, these being re­
finements of Piaget's original formulations.
The present experiment clearly shows that, in 
effect, realism, artificialism, animism, and so 
on, are so many beliefs that disappear little 
by little to be replaced by more objective, or 
more physical concepts. A rather long period
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is always observed during which primitive notions 
are still intermingled with explanations of a 
superior type, but nothing indicates that the 
superior performances are derived from a trans­
formation or an integration of inferior perfor­
mances. Physicalism is not the natural expansion 
of realism or of articialism in the same sense 
that operational thinking, for example, is the 
prelongation and the consummation of preoperation- 
al thinking (1962, p. 259).
Historically, Comte (1830-42) also believed that later 
thought stages do not completely eliminate the earlier 
notions.
Critics of the stage concept point to the overlapping 
of age groups. This argument is not viable in view of our 
awareness of individual differences. Huang (1943) pro­
claims that because a child's response is stimulus deter­
mined, no general stage of thinking can be attributed to 
him. Looft and Bartz (1969) take the critics to task for 
not approaching the cogent question, that of verifying the 
constancy of the sequential order of a child's mode of 
thought. This would best be examined via a longitudinal 
study involving many Ss, a rare species in psychology 
today.
Methodological Considerations in the Investigation
of Animism
Animism has been studied almost exclusively with verbal 
techniques. A few researchers utilized experiments involv­
ing simple objects testing cause and effect relationships 
as a means of evaluating the concept of aliveness. Two 
general trends in verbal techniques have been developed.
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One, following Piaget's lead, employs a questionnaire 
with sufficient inquiry procedures to determine the Ŝ 's 
rationale in answering. The other variation is to simply 
record Ste "yes" or "no" responses to the question "Is the
_____  alive or not?". Further lack of standardization has
been evident in the test items, the wording of the ques­
tions, and in the analysis of the data.
Piaget1s Clinical Method and Subsequent Refinements
Piaget's clinical method consisted of a question and 
answer session with each subject. Specifically, the child
was asked "Is the _____  alive?", with such stimulus words
as moon, river, sun, stone, etc. being supplied. Then 
follow-up questions were asked, in which the subject is 
asked to justify his response. Piaget claims that even 
counter-suggestion cannot move the child to change his 
opinion, thus providing an impressive measure of the depth 
of the convictions.
His method has been much criticized, although most of 
the allegations against it were discussed by Piaget himself, 
with warnings against the pitfalls intrinsic in it (1929). 
His point of departure was observation of spontaneous com­
ments by children, then a formulation of a flexible sche­
dule of queries to put to other subjects. Piaget made it 
clear that one must substantiate interview findings with 
further pure observation.
Issacs (1930) and Deutsche (1937) severely criticize 
Piaget's clinical method as being sterotyped and the
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questions suggestive, the situation being thus more con­
ducive to eliciting the child's fantasies than his intel­
lectual tools.
A pioneer in the survey questionnaire approach was 
G. Stanley Hall (1883) who also discussed the types of 
replies occurring under such conditions. Hall insists, as 
does Piaget (1929) that despite these disadvantages, there 
are certain elements "which every tactful and experienced 
friend of children" learns to ferret out. The hallmark of 
the clinical method seems to be intuition and experience. 
Although Piaget painstakingly devoted the first part of 
The Child's Conception of the World (1929) to discussion 
of the problems inherent in the method, the readings never­
theless left other experimenters without a precise, practi­
cal method to use with their subjects. In the light of 
this problem, Russell and Dennis (1939, 1941) undertook to 
standardize a method for measuring animism. Their result 
was a list of 20 objects, including such objects as a 
stone, tree, broken dish, dog, and broken button. The
subject was asked of each object, "Is the _______ alive or
dead? Why?" Additional questions were asked regarding 
autonomous or imparted movement when necessary. Most of 
the 385 Ss examined by Russess and Dennis (1933, 1941) aged 
3 to 15 could be classified as functioning in one of four 
stages of animism described by Piaget (1933).
A further refinement of the questionnaire technique 
was developed by Laurendeau and Pinard (1962) for their
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investigation of precausal thought. The "concept of life" 
questionnaire was administered to 500 £s between the ages 
of 4 and 13 in Montreal, Canada. The authors introduced 
the subject matter by asking, "Do you know what it is to 
be alive? What does it mean? Give me the name of some 
things which are alive." Then the child was questioned 
specifically about 22 objects, e.g., "Is a mountain alive? 
Why do you say it is (not) alive?" Another section of the 
questionnaire dealt with comparisons: the child was asked
if certain things were "more alive" than others. Not sur- 
prizingly, the data from this section was quite confusing 
and the results were eliminated from the main analysis.
Factors Affecting Animism in Test Situations
The meaning of the questions. While many of the 
early investigators were confident that the question "Is 
it alive?" would be interpreted similarily by the child 
as by the experimenter, Russell (1940b) was the first to 
attempt clarification of just what an affirmative reply to 
this question might mean. Russell employed a standard set 
of questions, substituting "knowing" and "feeling" for 
"living or dead". His results showed significant positive 
correlations between the stages of animism and the stages 
of these allied concepts. The correlations, further, were 
much higher than those obtained between animistic stage 
and either M.A. or chronological age. Russell interpreted 
the data as measuring similar concepts and that a measure
of animism was also an index of the S's concept of life. 
Looft and Bartz (1969) pointed out that Russell used the 
dichotomy "living" vs. "dead", terms quite different from 
"living" and "not living". "Dead" implies having once 
been alive, whereas "not living" does not. Children some­
times classify a broken dish as "dead" because is is of 
no use (Russell & Dennis, 1939). A further test would be 
presentation of a situation where an object is repaired 
and made usable once again. If £  said "dead" in response 
to the fixed object, then his reasoning would be on a 
higher level than Piaget's Stage One. Piaget (1920) found 
similar stages of "consciousness" attribution as he did 
levels of animism. That is, he found that the child in 
Stage Two of animism would attribute "consciousness" to 
an object which moved, regardless of whether the movement 
was spontaneous or imparted.
Several investigations have dealt with contrasting 
various phrases which all mean "being or not being alive" 
to an educated adult. Phrases included "living" vs. 
"non-living" (Crowell & Dole, 1957), "living" vs. "having 
life" (Huang & Lee, 1945), and "living" vs. "has it life?" 
(Klingberg, 1957). Some argue that when a child says that 
something is "living" he does not necessarily endow it 
with all the biological qualities and/or spiritual charac­
teristics of humans. To determine this, Huang and Lee 
(1945) asked their subjects if an object was living, has 
life, and also whether the same ob act feels pain when
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pricked, is capable of wanting and not wanting, can be 
good or not good, has anything it must do (function), and 
performs this purposely. The authors found that their Ss, 
ages 3:5 to 8:7, said an inanimate object was "living” 
in only a small percentage of cases. Further, the Ss 
often refused to attribute anthropomorphic traits to the 
same inanimate objects previously said to"have life". Huang 
and Lee interpreted their data as showing that the child's 
usage of the term "living" does not have the same meaning 
to a child as to an educated adult.
The distinction between "is it living?" and "has it 
life?" was studied by Klingberg (1957). He obtained more 
animistic answers to the former question, which may have 
puzzled some ,Ss. This confusion may have led to no answer 
at all or to one not indicative of the child's thinking.
The use of the question "why?" in order to clarify 
the child's rationale has elicited criticism (Klingensmith, 
1953). Nass (1956) found that more animistic replies are 
given to questions beginning with "why" than to those 
starting with "how do you know". There is some reason to 
suggest that the "why" question may be interpreted by the 
child as a demand for immediate justification of his 
position, a "cornering" technique. This may cause the 
child to give a rather hurried, superficial response, more 
likely to be of an animistic quality. On the other hand, 
a "how?" may signal the subject that he is to give more 
analytical support, thus encouraging him to take more time
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to think and subsequently giving a more mature ("non- 
animistic") explanation (Looft & Bartz, 1969).
Items employed on the questionnaire. The choice 
of objects in a questionnaire format seems to affect the 
amount of animism obtained. Klingensmith (19 53) found 
that his Ss were almost 10 times as likely to say that 
a clock or a candle were alive than to say the same about 
a match, dish, knife, or comb. Note that the clock and 
the candle (if the child thinks of it as lighted) both 
exhibit a seemingly autonomous movement, whereas the other 
objects do not.
Deutsche (1937) and Huang (1943) report that the child 
shows marked inconsistencies in responding. They argue 
that if a child's mode of thinking is generally precausal, 
then he should attack all problems with this same procli­
vity. A counter argument is the degree-of-familiarity 
notion, which holds that the more direct experience a 
child has with an object, the more likely he will react to 
it on a realistic, objective, knowledgeable basis. This 
description of situation confrontation certainly holds for 
all humans, regardless of age. Studies involving men­
tally retarded Ss who show a high incidence of 
animism, indicate the more familiar the S is with the 
phenomenon, the less animism is exhibited (Granich, 1940; 
Russell, Ash, & Dennis, 1940). In the light of this 
notion, then, the objects on a questionnaire list with 
which the child is the most familiar should be the ones
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eliciting the least animism. In general this is true, but 
it appears that the characteristics of the object might 
serve as stimulus cues more often than just the amount of 
direct contact by the child.
Analyses of the Data
What behaviors constitute animism? A recurrent 
disagreement has been what behaviors constitute the exis­
tence of animism and whether this must be consistently 
portrayed by the child across all situations. Piaget’s 
theory was interpreted by some as stating that animism is 
present all the time in younger Ss, whereas others (e.g., 
Jahoda, 1958a) have culled his writings for exceptions to 
the rule.
A number of studies concluding that there is no evi­
dence for the presence of animism can be interpreted in 
another manner. For example, Oakes, (1947) refuted the 
notion that animistic thought is characteristic in child­
ren's thinking. This may be a valid conclusion, but her 
data does show that from 4% to 10% of the various age 
groups gave nonphysical explanations. The controversy 
seems to stem from the disagreement as to what constitutes 
evidence fro the presence of animism.
Strauss (1951) in a critical re-evaluation of the 
data of Huang and Lee (1945) demonstrated how their con­
clusions could be refuted by a reinterpretation of the 
same data. Strauss also was critical of the criteria em­
ployed by Huang and Lee (1945).
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Individual vs. grouped data. Dissimilar methods 
of data analysis have caused problems in the exploration of 
animism. Researchers who generally favor the existence 
of animism have utilized group analyses. These investiga­
tors concentrate on the number of children giving at least 
one animistic response during the entire experimental 
procedure. Representatives of this type of analysis are 
Piaget, the Russell and Dennis studies, and Laurendeau and 
Pinard (1962). Investigators generally opposed to the 
hypothesis of precausality have typically analyzed each 
item, noting the percentage of Ss who react animistically 
to it. Since children seem to react differentially to many 
inanimate objects in terms of their willingness to attri­
bute life, it is easy to see how the latter method would 
yield lower frequencies of animism. Among experimenters 
using the second approach are Huang and Lee (1945), Kling- 
berg (1957) , Klingensmith (1953), and Oakes (1947). Looft 
and Bartz (1969) suggest experimenter bias may have been 
operating a priori to produce the choice of units for 
analysis.
Individual item analysis involves summing the number 
of "yes" and "no" responses to questions about the objects 
(Huang & Lee, 1945). As Laurendeau and Pinard (1962) 
astutely reasoned, a "correct" response does not necessarily 
indicate that the logic underlying it is also correct.
They cite examples of pseudo-solutions, quoting Ausubel 
and Schiff (1954) and Greco (1959). It is further argued
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that if "one is to estimate correctly any single child's 
true level of thinking, a global analysis of the entire 
pattern of his responses is necessary" (Looft & Bartz,
1969, p. 6). Looft and Bartz (1969) conclude their remarks 
on this question by stating that while differences in 
data analysis account somewhat for some divergent results, 
studies using the same methods of examination can also 
yield markedly disparate findings.
The Problem
The present research seeks to provide information on 
the following questions:
1. To what extent are animistic responses situation 
and task specific? Some researchers have used verbal 
questionnaire tasks with varying degrees of inquiry; others 
have presented demonstrations of physical experiments de­
signed to test the child's knowledge of cause and effect 
relationships. It is difficult to compare results from 
these two types of situations. In the present study, the 
concept of aliveness was tested in three situations which 
differ in the degree of abstraction of the stimuli. 
Responses to items on a verbal questionnaire, a pictorial 
card sort, and a model representation in a story inquiry 
task were compared.
2. Are there differences in the amount of animism as 
a function of age and sex? Previous studies have failed 
to demonstrate sex differences, and there is a marked 
disagreement about developmental decrements in animism.
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The present study involved a 3 year age range designed to 
ferret out age differences in animistic thinking.
3. What criteria do preschool Ss use in inferring 
the concept of "living" as opposed to "non-living” in 
objects? The method of having children separate objects 
or pictures into several categories which might be asso­
ciated with the concept of animism was used, following 
the suggestion of Looft and Bartz (1969; personal communi­
cation with Looft, 1969). The use of a card sorting task 
in the present study provided information on how Ss define 
"living" and "not living", as well as the consistency of 
application of these concepts across exemplars.
METHOD
Subjects
The sample consisted of 60 children between the ages 
of 3 and 6 years. The Ss, from private nursery schools 
and public kindergarten classes in the Los Angeles area, 
were selected on the basis of the absence of any signifi­
cant behavioral or emotional problem. Freedom from gross 
behavioral problems was judged on the basis of interviews 
with the teachers. The kindergarten Ss had at least one 
year of nursery school experience. Ten Ss, five females 
and five males, constituted each 6-month age block.
Procedure
The study included three tasks, each presented indi­
vidually with order counter-balanced across Ss. Because 
of the high activity level and short attention span of the 
Ss, three sessions were required to complete the testing. 
An attempt was made to have sessions on consecutive school 
days. The maximum time span for any one S was 10 days.
The procedures for the three experimental tasks follow.
Questionnaire. The Concept of Life Questionnaire 
devised by Laurendeau and Pinard (1962) was used in this 
study. Laurendeau and Pinard caution that verbal tests 
on Ss less than 4 years of age are ineffective, however 
use of questionnaires in previous studies of animism
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warranted inclusion of this technique in a cross-method 
comparison. Two items were added to the Laurendeau-Pinard 
instrument to gain comparability with other instruments 
used in this study. The format for the task follows:
Instructions to E: Ask the child each one of the
following questions, trying always to make sure 
he understands it well. When necessary, the ques­
tions may be repeated. Record all answers verbatim. 
General Questions: "Do you know what it is to be
alive, to be living?" "Give me the name of some 
things which are alive."
Specific Questions: Note: Each item was typed on
a separate 3" x 5" card. The cards were shuffled 
for each S to ensure a random presentation. "You
know what a ______  is, don't you? Is a _____
alive?" "Why do you say that it is (not) alive?" 
Continue with the remaining 22 items, presenting
each one with the questions, "Is a _____  alive?"
After £  responds, then ask, "Why do you say that 
it is (not) alive?"
The 23 test items were as follows:
1. mountain 9. tree 17. airplane
2. table 10. bicycle 18. fire
3. cat 11. pencil 19. rain
4. lamp 12. sun 20. snake
5. bird 13. car 21. fish
6. wind 14. cloud 22. child (same sex as S)
7. fly 15. watch 23. dog
8. flower 16. bell
Card Sort task. Materials for this task consisted
32 cards with pictures of the following objects:
*1. mountain *17. fly
*2. sun *18. fire
3. broken pencil *19. flower
*4. car 20. broken dish
5. tricycle with 1 wheel *21. boy
*6. table *22. rain
*7. cat *23. tree
*8. cloud *24. snake
*9. lamp 25. motorcycle
*10. watch *26. fish
11. jack-in-the-box 27. crayon
*12. bird 28. Raggedy Ann doll
*13. bell 29. t.v. set
14. smoke 30. knife
15. pair of smashed glasses *31. dog
*16. airplane *32. girl
Items marked with an * are pictures of objects also pre­
sented on the Questionnaire. Only the picture of the 
child the same sex as £  was presented. The damaged items 
were included to test further the finding that a differen­
tial response is obtained to such objects because of their 
broken, and hence, useless state (Russell & Dennis, 1939).
Pictures were colored photographs, 3-1/2" by 3-1/2" 
with a pastel background, mounted on white mat board 4" by 
4", and covered with clear contact paper. The cards were 
numbered in the upper left hand corner to simplify scoring. 
The cards were shuffled before each presentation.
Six additional cards, constructed in an identical 
manner, served as sample stimuli. Objects pictured on 
these cards included:
1. stone 4. push toy
2. horses 5. pull toy
3. bricks 6. baby
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Photographs of the cards used in this task are found in 
Appendix A.
The set of 31 test cards were separated into the 
following categories: (1) moves vs. doesn't move, (2) is
alive vs. is not alive. £s were asked to sort cards 
they had placed in the "moves" category into one of the 
additional categories, "moves autonomously" or "doesn't 
move autonomously". Thus, there were 2 complete sorts 
and 1 partial sort.
The procedure for the card sort tasks follows:
E accompanied £  to the experimental situation and 
directed to sit in a chair at a table of the approxi­
mate height for the child. E sat directly opposite from J3.
Sample items:
E placed the two sample cards depicting the horses 
and the bricks on the table approximately 8 inches apart.
E said, "Here are pictures of two things, some horses 
(pointing) and some bricks (pointing). One of these things 
moves and one thing does not move. Put your finger on the 
thing that moves." If S responded correctly, E said "Fine" 
or "Good". Then E said "Now put your finger on the thing 
which does not move." If S again responded correctly, E 
praised his response and proceeded with the test items.
If S chose the incorrect sample card, E said, "No, 
this (indicating the correct choice) is the thing that 
moves. Now, put your finger on the thing which does not 
move". If S responded correctly, E said "Fine" or "Good".
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Then the second set of sample cards was placed on top 
of the first set. E said "Here are pictures of a baby and 
a stone. Put your finger on the thing which moves." The 
rest of the sample directions were identical to those of 
the first sample. Following the second sample, E pro­
ceeded with the test items.
The complete list of the sample cards for the cate­
gories follows:
CATEGORY 
Moves vs. doesn't move.
Moves autonomously vs. 
doesn't move 
autonomously.




1) horse and bricks
2) baby and stone
1) horse and push toy
2) baby and pull toy
1) baby and bricks
2) horse and stone
The first test card was placed on the table below and 
equidistant from the sample cards which remained visible.
E said, "Does this not move, or does it move?" After S 
indicated his response, E said, "Then it goes right here" 
(placing the card directly below the corresponding sample, 
turning the test card face down in the process). "Things 
which move go here (indicating the position on the table 
relative to the horse card) and the things which do not 
move go here" (indicating the appropriate place). The 
remainder of the test cards were presented, each being held 
slightly above the table to encourage S to take the card 
and place it in the stack he selected.
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The additional categories of the card sort were pre­
sented in the same manner.
Order and sequences of positive and negative forms 
of the question were randomized, within the constraints 
that half of the questions were positive forms, and that 
runs were limited to 2. The following are positive and 
negative question forms:
1. a. Does this move or does it not move?
b. Does this not move or does it move?
2. a. Does this move by itself or does it
not move by itself? 
b. Does this not move by itself or does 
it move by itself?
3. a. Is this alive or is it not alive?
b. Is this not alive or is it alive?
Reliability;
A reliability study of the Card Sort stimuli was con­
ducted using 10 3-year-old Ss, half of them being younger 
than 3 years 7 months. All Ss attended a private nursery 
school.
The test was administered twice, with one week inter­
val between sessions. The procedure for the test follows:
E accompanied S to the experimental situation and 
directed S to sit in a chair at a table of the appropriate 
height for the child. E sat directly opposite S.
E placed the 2 sample cards depicting the baby and 
the bricks on the table with the comment, "Here are two 
pictures. One thing, the baby (pointing to the baby) is 
alive, but the bricks are not alive." If S succeeded, E
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said "Fine” or "Good." Then E said, "Now put your finger 
on the thing which is not alive." The correct response 
was reinforced. If S failed the first sample, E corrected 
him and presented the second sample, pictures of a horse 
and a stone. The procedure was identical to that of the 
first sample. The 31 test items were then presented using 
the "Alive-Not Alive" categories in the same manner as 
described above for the actual research.
A Spearman Rank correlation coefficient was performed.
The S's rank was determined by the total number of cards
in which objects depicted were called alive compared to
the number so labeled by the other 9 Ss for the session.
The resulting correlation represents the relative stability
of position of the Ss across the two sessions. This
yielded an r = .908. From this data, the author concluded s
that the responses of the 3-year-olds to the Card Sort 
items are sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this 
study. The high reliability in response stability for 
the 3-year-olds indicates that the responses of older 
children would also show stability.
Story Inquiry task. The materials for this task in­
cluded a stage depicting an outdoor scene, a model of a 
tree, and 5 toy objects. The 1/4" plywood floor of the 
stage measured 3' by 4' upon which artificial grass was 
attached. Finely ground brown sawdust was used to outline 
a road. The 1/4" plywood background of the stage measured
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2' high and 4' wide. This was painted pale blue, with 
5 fluffy white clouds. A circle 2" in diameter was drilled, 
through which the head of a flashlight was inserted. A 
circle with rays was cut from yellow tissue paper placed 
over frosted acetate. This was positioned over the hole 
in the background to represent the sun.
The artificial tree was constructed using a branch 
from an actual bush. Small plastic leaves were pasted on
the branches. The tree was 24" high and approximately
24" across at the top. The toys included 2 orange steel 
Volkswagons, one having a smashed roof, a bendable white 
and brown dog resembling a fox terrier and measuring 1" 
high and 1" long, and bendable boy and girl dolls, each 
2-3/4" high. The scale of the objects was 3/4" to 1'. 
Photographs of the stimuli are found in Appendix B.
The procedure for the Story Inquiry Task follows:
The stage was set on a table of appropriate height in
the experimental room, with the tree positioned on the
grass in the upper right quadrant of the floor of the 
stage. Four of the toy objects were arranged randomly to 
the left of the stage. Only the doll of the same sex was 
used with each S. E led the child to the stage and said, 
"Here are some things which you may play with or do what­
ever you wish." E allowed S to investigate the equipment 
for 3 minutes. Then E said, "Now I have some stories I 
would like for you to hear. I will move some of the toys 
around while the tape recorder plays a story." S was
seated in a chair in front of the stage while the stories 
were being presented. E began the tape of the first story 
and manipulated the appropriate objects. After the first 
story was completed, E said, "Now I have some questions 
about the story we just saw." The set of questions cor­
responding to the story presented was asked. E recorded 
£'s answers verbatim on a data sheet. Then the second 
story and set of questions was presented, then the third. 
Stories were presented in a counterbalanced order across 
Ss.
Each story involved 4 primary objects and 2 background 
objects not directly involved in the action. The same 6 
objects were used in all 3 stories: a dog, a child (same
sex as S), a tree, a car, the sun, and the clouds. The 
list included 3 living and 3 non-living objects. Previous 
research has shown that younger children often regard a 
tree as not living (Laurendeau and Pinard, 1962; Huang and 
Lee, 1945), thus its inclusion in the present study.
The actions of the three stories used for this task 
were as follows: (1) the car in the road hits the dog,
(2) a branch from the tree falls and smashes the top of 
the car, and (3) the child is running and trips over the 
dog. The tape transcripts of the narrations of the stories 
follow:
"Here are some stories about a boy (girl), a dog, a 
car, and a tree. The sun is shining in the sky and some 
clouds are scattered about. Here is our first story."
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(Story 1) "The boy (girl) is playing in the grass.
The car is in the street. The dog looks as though he's 
pretty close to the street. I hope that car isn't moving,
(pause) Now the dog is going farther out into the street.
The car i£ moving. (pause) The car is really getting
close to the dog now. The dog doesn't see the car coming, 
(pause) The car has hit the dog and he's lying down in 
the street." (End of story 1)
(Story 2) "In this story we see the car parked 
beneath the tree. The boy(girl) and the dog are playing 
in the grass nearby (pause) It looks like something is
happening to a branch on the tree. (pause) Yes, the 
branch has broken off the tree and has fallen on top of 
the car. (pause) The branch really crushed the top of 
the car." (End of story 2).
(Story 3) "This time the car is parked by the street. 
The dog is lying down in the grass and the boy (girl) is 
running. (pause) It looks as though the boy (girl) is 
not watching where he's (she's) going, (pause) The boy 
(girl) had better look quickly or he (she) might run into 
the dog. (pause) The boy (girl) didn't see the dog and 
has tripped over him. (pause) He's (she's) really taking 
a tumble. (pause) The boy (girl) has fallen all the way 
over the dog and is lying in the grass." (End of story 3) 
The inquiry questions for the stories follow. Each 
of the primary questions is numbered. The additional
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questions were asked if S responded affirmatively to the 
primary question.
Story 1: Car hits the dog.
1. The car hit the dog; is it the car's fault?
How is it the car's fault?
2. Is it the dog's fault?
How is it the dog's fault?
3. Did the car mean to hit the dog?
4. Should someone or something be punished for what
happened? Who should be punished? How should
they be punished?
5. Does the sun know what happened?
How does the sun feel about what happened?
6. Does the tree know what happened?
How does the tree feel about what happened?
7. Do the clouds know what happened?
How does the tree feel about what happened?
8. Does the boy (girl) know what happened?
How does the boy (girl) feel about what happened?
Story 2: Branch hits the car.
1. The branch hit the car; is it the tree's fault? 
How is it the tree's fault?
2. Is it the car's fault?
How is it the car's fault?
3. Did the tree branch mean to hit the car?
4. Should someone or something be punished for what
happened? Who should be punished? How should
they be punished?
5. Do the coulds know what happened?
How do the clouds feel about what happened?
6. Does the boy (girl) know what happened?
How does the boy (girl) feel about what happened.
7. Does the sun know what happened?
How does the sun feel about what happened?
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8. Does the dog know what happened?
How does the dog feel about what happened?
Story 3: Child trips over the dog.
1. The boy (girl) tripped over the dog; is it the 
boy (girl's) fault? How is it the boy's 
(girl's) fault?
2. Is it the dog's fault?
How is it the dog's fault?
3. Did the dog mean to trip the boy (girl)?
4. Should someone or something be punished for what 
happened? Who should be punished? How should 
they be punished?
5. Does the tree know what happened?
How does the tree feel about what happened?
6. Do the clouds know what happened?
How do the clouds feel about what happened?
7. Does the car know what happened?
How does the car feel about what happened?
8. Does the sun know what happened?
How does the sun feel about what happened?
After the third story inquiry S was asked specifically 
if the 6 objects common to all 3 tasks were alive or not 
alive. The 6 objects were the sun, the clouds, the car, 
the tree, the dog, and the boy or girl. Names of the 6 
objects were typed on 2" by 3" cards and shuffled before 
each presentation. Positive and negative forms of the 
question were alternated, with the positive form occurring 
first. The forms of the question were:
Is the _______ alive or is it not alive?
Is the not alive or is it alive?
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Data Analysis
Validity and reliability of the experiments1 tasks. 
Validity of the instruments used in this study rests on 
two procedures. First, the items were generated to re­
flect the construct animism as defined. Second, consis­
tent response patterns by subjects on similar items on 
the standardized instrument, the Questionnaire test, and 
the new instruments would reflect concurrent validity. 
Animism, as defined in this study is the attribution of 
life to inanimate objects. The Ss in the present research 
were asked directly in each of three situations if objects 
were alive or not alive.
High interjudge reliability for the Questionnaire 
task was obtained by Laurendeau & Pinard. These authors 
and an independent judge classified 97% of the protocols 
in the same stage (Laurendeau & Pinard, 1962). High retest 
reliability for items on the Card Sort was reported in an 
earlier section of this paper. The Story Inquiry task 
was not tested directly for consistency in responding, but 
items for this instrument were assumed to be reliable on 
the basis of results of the other 2 tasks.
Three additional statistical techniques were employed 
to estimate item reliability across all 3 tasks, repre­
senting some aspects of both construct validity and intra­
subject reliability. Two techniques were used to evaluate 
intra-subject consistency in responding over the 3 tasks.
(1) Tetrachoric correlations were calculated for items
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common to 2 or 3 of the experimental situations. (2) As 
an indication of response consistency over all 3 tasks, 
instances of perfect response consistency for 6 items 
common to all situations were tallied by age groups. A 
third technique was used to indicate if characteristics of 
the stimulus items had some degree of consistency over the 
3 situations. Differences in proportions of Ss calling 
each of 4 objects alive on the 3 tasks was interpreted as 
situational independence of subject responses. The 4 
objects common to all modes of presentation were the sun, 
clouds, tree, and car. The proportions were tested by 
X*'. The null hypothesis stated that there was no difference 
among the tasks in the number of Ss responding "alive."
Examination of Task Equivalence
The first question posed by this research was the 
extent to which animistic responses are situation and task 
specific. To shed some light on this question, a system 
for scoring animism for each task was devised. The scoring 
criteria follow:
Questionnaire. The protocols were scored such that an 
animistic response (where an inanimate object was said to 
be alive) received 1 point and a non-animistic response 0.
£'s animism score was the total number of items to which S 
made an animistic response. The maximum number of points 
was 14, the number of items which presented inanimate 
objects.
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Card Sort. The score for the 31 items on this task 
was calculated in a manner identical to the Questionnaire, 
with the maximum number of points being 22.
Story Inquiry. Individual scores for this task con­
sisted of the number of affirmative replies given to the 
following questions:
1. Does the sun know what happened? (Story 1)
2. Does the tree know what happened? (Story 1)
3. Do the clouds know what happened? (Story 1)
4. Do the clouds know what happened? (Story 2)
5. Does the sun know what happened? (Story 2)
6. Does the tree know what happened? (Story 3)
7. Do the clouds know what happened? (Story 3)
8. Does the car know what happened? (Story 3)
9. Does the sun know what happened? (Story 3)
10. Is the sun alive (End of last story)
11. Is the car alive? (End of last story)
12. Are the clouds alive? (End of last story)
The maximum number of points for this task was 12. Ani­
mism scores were intercorrelated for the three tasks as 
an index of task equivalence.
As a further test of the differential effect of tasks, 
Questionnaire and Card Sort protocols were also rated as 
to the stages achieved by Ss on each task. On the basis 
of data secured from 500 Ss, Laurendeau and Pinard (1962)
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revised the stages of animism originally posited by 
Piaget (1929). The 4 stages of animism formulated by 
Laurendeau and Pinard were used to categorize Ss in the 
current study on the Questionnaire and the Card Sort.
Two psychologists and the author working without consulta­
tion used the following criteria to classify the proto­
cols for each S on the Questionnaire. These criteria are 
Laurendeau and Pinard's descriptions of the thinking 
typical of children in each stage of animism.
Stage 0: Incomprehension or refusal. This stage
comprises those Ss who could not understand the questions 
or answered at random without ever giving valid explana­
tions. Often a subject in Stage 0 will use the same 
reason to attribute and deny life to objects, thus illus­
trating his ignorance of logical operations. This results 
in contradictions in the protocol, typical of infantile, 
prelogical thinking. The child's "yes's" and "no's" often 
seem to be independent of his explanations.
Stage 1: Animistic Thinking Based on Usefulness,
Anthropomorphism, or Movement. Subjects in this stage com­
mit errors of the animistic type by attributing life to 
one or many inanimate objects. These Ss use criteria 
which are imperfect, but the authors remark on the con­
sistency of the child's thinking. "He never resorts to 
the same reason to attribute or refuse life" (Laurendeau 
& Pinard, 1962, p. 145). Frequently a combination of two 
or even three of these criteria can be seen in explanations.
44
Some children may refuse life to plants and trees by 
reason that they do not move, or are perceived by the 
child to be immobile.
Stage 2: Autonomous Movement with Some Residual
Thinking. This stage, characterized as one of transition, 
is distinguished from Stage 1 by the discovery of 2 dis­
tinct sources of movement. Only one of these, that is, 
where the source of the movement is the object itself, 
now serves as a criterion for life. Laurendeau and Pinard 
discuss how this criterion alone does not serve to cause 
the total disappearance of animism. Most importantly, 
children continue for some time to delude themselves as 
to the real source of movement, particularly with regard 
to those objects most removed from direct experience, such 
as the wind, sun, moon, etc. Another reason is that "the 
discovery of autonomous movement does not definitely dis­
place the inadequate or imperfect criteria of the first 
stage. In fact, the most frequent occurrence is that the 
child relies upon autonomy to justify some of his responses, 
but for the other responses still resorts frequently to 
usefulness of objects, to their possessing anthropomorphic 
traits, or to their general movement. All subjects of 
this stage, however, at least make a mention of autonomous 
movement." (Laurendeau & Pinard, 1962, p. 147.)
Stage 3: Total Disappearance of Animistic Thinking.
Subjects in this stage never grant life to inanimate ob­
jects, at least to those listed in the Questionnaire. The
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reverse of this is not true, that is, Ss often refuse 
life to some animate objects, especially plants, on the 
basis of lack of autonomy and for anthropomorphic reasons. 
Explanations given may be anthropomorphic, or based upon 
usefulness or activity.
The complete set of instructions given to the judges 
can be found in Appendix C.
Interjudge reliability of the classification system 
was estimated by the extent of agreement among the 3 
judges as to the stage of animistic thinking reflected in 
responses. There was perfect agreement in 72% of the 
cases (43) and ratings within 1 stage of agreement in 28% 
of the cases (17). There was only 1 case where judges 
differed by more than 1 stage. These figures indicate 
the classifying system to be adequate for purposes of this 
study. The final stage assigned to each S was the mean of 
the 3 judges' ratings.
Determination of the stages of animism achieved on 
the Card Sort involved employment of the following criteria.
Stage 0: If an S placed 2 or fewer animate objects
in the "alive" category or 4 or fewer inanimate objects 
in the "not alive" category, then S's sorting was considered 
random and done without any comprehension of the concept.
Stage 1: An £  was placed in the Stage 1 category if
he committed one or more errors in the "alive", "autonomous 
movement", and the "movement" categories. Further, if 
additional errors were made in the "movement" category but
46
not in the "autonomous movement" classification, was 
judged to be in Stage 1. An error was defined as placing 
an inanimate object in the animate category.
Stage 2: If the £  made one or more errors in the
"alive" and the "autonomous movement" categories, he was 
classified as being in Stage 2. If the same inanimate 
objects were called both "moving" and "autonomously moving", 
S_ was judged to be in this stage. Further, if one or 
more of the inanimate objects called not alive were put 
in the "not autonomously moving" category, S_ was placed 
in Stage 2.
Stage 3: If no errors were made in the "alive" cate­
gory, S was placed in Stage 3, regardless of whether 
errors were made in other sorts.
A comparison of stages reached by the Ss on the 
Questionnaire and the Card Sort was made by tabulating the 
frequencies of each occurrence and converting to a pro­
portion of the total cases.
An inspection of the data on the 3 tasks was made to 
see if animism decreased with increasing concreteness of 
the stiumlus mode.
Effect of Age and Sex on Animism
To examine the question of whether there are differ­
ences in the amount of animism as a function of age and 
sex, an analysis of variance using animism scores was 
calculated for each of the 3 tasks.
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Many of the analyses in the present study dealt 
with the Ss' internal consistency in responding. Because 
some researchers in the past have utilized a quantitative 
approach to each item, percentages of animistic errors 
were tallied for each age level for each inanimate object 
listed on the Questionnaire, the Card Sort, and the Story 
Inquiry. This allowed a more direct comparison of the 
present data with previous findings.
Analysis of Criteria for Life
Several content analyses of responses to the Ques­
tionnaire and the Story Inquiry were completed to examine 
the criteria Ss used to attribute life. Another technique 
related answers to the general items on the Question­
naire to the stage rating achieved.
To permit a visual comparison of the association 
between aliveness and movement, and between aliveness and 
autonomous movement, instances of Ss placing inanimate 
objects of the Card Sort in 8 comparison categories were 
tallied. The paired-variable groupings included: alive
and moving, not alive and not moving, alive and not moving, 
not alive and moving, alive and autonomously moving, not 
alive and not autonomously moving, alive and not autono­
mously moving, and not alive and autonomously moving. The 
inanimate objects on the Card Sort are listed on page 30. 
The frequencies were then exhibited by age groups.
RESULTS
Reliability of the Experimental Tasks
In comparing the performance of Ss on 3 tasks, an 
area of initial importance is that of cross method reliabi­
lity of individual items. Are there indications that each 
task was independent of the others? What evidence is there 
that responses to individual items were sufficiently con­
sistent to warrant judgments concerning the conceptual 
development of Ss in terms of animism?
An affirmative response to the former question comes 
from the data concerning the proportion of total Ss 
calling each of four objects alive across the three tasks.
These proportions were analyzed in terms of chi square 
2(X ), the values of which are presented in Table I.
TABLE I
CHI SQUARE (X2) VALUES FOR TOTAL Ss 








None of the values in Table I reached the level of 
statistical significance, indicating the differences in 
the proportion of Ss calling an item alive on one task as 
compared with either of the other tasks could be attribut­
ed to chance. Note that this calculation analyzed a 
specific characteristic of the objects, i.e., their 
"aliveness", as opposed to later analyses which deal with 
response consistency, the extent to which Ss responded 
similarily to the same items in different contexts regard­
less of whether they perceived them as "alive" or "not 
alive".
Two techniques measured consistency of responses to 
common items across tasks. Tetrachoric correlations, 
used to estimate intra-subject consistency for items 
across tasks, are presented in Table II.
As shown in Table II, significant intra-subject 
response consistency was found for 15 of the 20 items 
shared by the Questionnaire and the Card Sort. Intra­
subject agreement was significant for 5 of the 6 ob­
jects common to the Questionnaire and the Story Inquiry 
and all 6 items appearing jointly on the Story Inquiry 
and the Card Sort. In general, the tendency of the 
child to regard an object either animistically or 
realistically generalized across the methods of presen­
tation.
A more rigorous test of response consistency involved 
a tabulation of the instances of perfect agreement for
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TABLE II
TETRACHORIC CORRELATIONS (rt) FOR 





















child .66 ** .68 ** .68 **
dog .26 * .15 . 33 **
tree .36 ** .58 ** .41 **
sun .15 .26 * .36 **
car .67 ** .31 * .46 **
cloud .20 .35 ** .57 **
* p < .05, df = 58
** p < .01, df = 58
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items across all 3 tasks. Six items were common to all 
3 tasks. Therefore, each S had 6 opportunities to agree 
perfectly; the total possible instances of agreement for 
each age group was 120. The proportions and percentages 
reflecting occurrences of identical intra-subject respond­
ing by age groups are shown in Table III.
TABLE III
INSTANCES OF PERFECT INTRA-SUBJECT 
AGREEMENT FOR COMMON ITEMS ACROSS 3 TASKS BY
AGE GROUPS




The increase of consistent responding with age 
indicates that the Ss become more reliable in their 
responses, and that in each of the 3 tasks common elements 
were presented, an index of construct validity. For, if 
the tasks were not measuring a single internalized con­
cept, Ss would have become less consistent as their dis­
criminatory abilities developed with age.
Task Equivalence
Analyses were completed to yield information about 
the effect of differing stimulus modes on the elicitation 
of an equivalent class of responses. The 3 tasks
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employed in the present study differed in the degree 
of abstraction of the stimulus presentation. The Ques­
tionnaire provided a verbal presentation, the Card Sort 
a pictorial representation, and the Story Inquiry a three- 
dimensional model.
Performances on the Questionnaire, the Card Sort, 
and the Story Inquiry tasks were evaluated to yield an 
animism score for each. As an indication of the effect 
of different stimulus modes upon the elicitation of ani­
mistic responses, these animism scores were intercorrelat­
ed using Pearson's r as shown in Table IV.
TABLE IV
INTERCORRELATIONS (r) OF ANIMISM 
SCORES FOR ALL Ss ON THREE TASKS
Questionnaire Card Sort
Questionnaire .5292 **
Story Inquiry .4109 ** .3995 **
** £  < .01, df = 58
All three correlations in Table IV are statistically 
significant. Furthermore, the magnitudes of the inter­
correlations indicate that a construct of animism as 
defined in this study is tenable.
One approach to measuring task equivalence is to 
focus on the apparent dissimilarities of the three tasks.
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To determine whether animism decreased with increasing 
concreteness of the stimulus form, a tabulation was made 
of instances where S called an inanimate object alive on 
the Questionnaire or on the Questionnaire and the Card 
Sort, but denied it life on the Story Inquiry task. Three- 
year-olds evidenced this 16 times, 4-year-olds 11 times, 
and 5-year-olds 13 times. These data are not sufficient 
to establish a statistical trend, but the small differences 
with increasing age are in the predicted direction.
In the final test of task equivalence performances 
on the Questionnaire and the Card Sort were compared. On 
the basis of responses to items on these 2 tasks, each £ 
was assigned to a "stage" of animism. Stages of animism 
achieved by £s on the Questionnaire and the Card Sort 
were compared by construction of a matrix placing each £  
on the basis of his rated stage of animism on the Card 
Sort and the Questionnaire, as shown in Table V.
TABLE V
DISTRIBUTION OF ALL Ss IN EACH STAGE OF 
ANIMISM ON THE QUESTIONNAIRE AND THE CARD SORT
Card Sort
Questionnaire
Stage 0 Stage 1 Stage 2 Stage 3
Stage 0 10 2
Stage 1 4 10 6
Stage 2 5 4 5 7
Stage 3 2 2 3
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Inspection of Table V reveals that 28 Ss achieved 
identical stages on the 2 tasks. Fifteen £s were rated 
higher on the Questionnaire than on the Card Sort, whereas 
17 £s obtained higher ratings on the Card Sort than on 
the Questionnaire. Of the Ss placed in a different stage 
on the 2 tasks, about half of these were rated higher on 
the Card Sort, and half higher on the Questionnaire, 
indicating measurement error, but not bias. That half 
of the total £s were rated at the same stage on both 
tasks provides additional evidence that the construct of 
animism as defined in this study was being reliably 
measured across tasks.
Animism as a Function of Age and Sex
To examine the question of whether there are dif­
ferences in the amount of animism as a function of age 
and sex, a 2 X 6 analysis of variance was calculated for 
each task using animism scores. A significant age effect 
was obtained as shown in Tables VI, VII, and VIII.
TABLE VI
2 X 6  ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE SUMMARY 
TABLE FOR THE QUESTIONNAIRE TASK
Source Sum of Squares df
Mean
Square F Significance
Age 590.80 5 101.96 4.45 <.01
Sex 8.06 1 8.06 . 35
Interaction 65.94 5 13.19 . 58




2 X 6  ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE SUMMARY 
TABLE FOR THE CARD SORT TASK
Source Sum of Squares df
Mean
Square F Significance
Age 1026.28 5 205.26 6.09 <.01
Sex 30.81 1 30.81 .91
Interaction 364.69 5 72.94 2.16
Within 1618.80 48 33.73
Total 3040.58 59
TABLE VIII
2 X 6  ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE SUMMARY 
TABLE FOR THE STORY INQUIRY TASK
Source Sum of Squares df
Mean
Square F Significance
Age 304.68 5 60.97 3.77 <.01
Sex . 81 1 .81 .05
Interaction 90.69 5 18.19 1.12
Within 776.40 48 16.18
Total 1172.58 59
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To provide information on individual items, animis­
tic errors were tallied for each age level and for each 
inanimate object listed on the 3 tasks, as presented in 
Tables IX, X, and XI.
TABLE IX
PERCENTAGE OF ANIMISTIC ERRORS FOR EACH AGE LEVEL 
AND FOR EACH INANIMATE OBJECT LISTED ON THE 
QUESTIONNAIRE
Item Age , , Mean %3-year-olds 4 -year-olds 5-year-olds
wind 85 55 40 60.0
cloud 85 50 35 56.7
bell 75 45 35 51.7
airplane 80 40 30 50.0
fire 70 45 35 50.0
sun 65 45 35 48.3
rain 70 40 35 48. 3
car 70 45 20 45.0
mountain 80 40 5 41.7
watch 65 40 20 41.7
bicycle 75 40 10 41.7
pencil 85 35 5 41.7
lamp 70 40 10 40.0
table 70 40 5 38.3
range 65-85 35-55 5-40 38.3-60.0
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TABLE X
PERCENTAGE OF ANIMISTIC ERRORS FOR EACH AGE LEVEL 
AND FOR EACH INANIMATE OBJECT LISTED ON THE CARD SORT
Age
3-year-olds 4-year-olds 5-year-olds Mean %
rain 60 55 30 48.3
airplane 70 45 25 46.7
jack-in-box 75 35 25 45.0
sun 55 50 30 45.0
smoke 70 30 30 43.3
doll 65 40 25 43. 3
cloud 50 40 40 43.3
motorcycle 65 40 20 41.7
fire 65 30 30 41.7
watch 55 45 25 41.7
broken tri­
cycle 60 45 15 40.0
T.V. 65 35 20 40.0
car 65 35 20 40.0
lamp 60 45 10 38. 3
bell 60 30 20 36.7
knife 55 35 20 36.7
broken dish 60 35 10 35.0
table 60 30 15 35.0
mountain 60 40 5 35.0
broken pencil 60 25 15 33. 3
crayon 45 40 10 31.7
broken glasses 60 20 10 30.0
range 45-75 20-55 5-40 30.0-48.
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TABLE XI
PERCENTAGE OF ANIMISTIC ERRORS FOR EACH AGE LEVEL 
AND FOR EACH INANIMATE OBJECT LISTED ON THE STORY INQUIRY
Item Age Mean %3-year-olds 4-year-olds 5-year-olds
sun 65 50 35 50. 0
car 75 40 30 48. 3
clouds 60 40 30 43.3
range 60-75 40-50 30-35 43. 3-50.1
These data indicate that the tendency to attribute 
life to an inanimate object decreases consistently with 
age for all 3 tasks. The percentages indicate that the 
younger children made more animistic errors than did 
older children. The age trend was more clearly seen on 
the Questionnaire than on the Card Sort or the Story 
Inquiry, supporting the evidence reported earlier that 
animism decreases slightly with increasing stimulus 
concreteness.
A comparison of the ranks of the mean percentages of 
Questionnaire objects in Table IX with similar data from 
Laurendeau and Pinard's (1962) study of the same items 
revealed a statistically significant correlation 
(rho = .8652, p  < .005, df = 12). Laurendeau and Pinard's
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sample included Ss from 4 to 12 years old, while the 
present study used 3-to 5-year-olds.
Criteria for Life
The purpose of this section is to elucidate evidence 
regarding criteria Ss used to decide whether an object 
was alive or not alive.
Before focusing on the criteria for life used by 
S s , the characteristic responses of Ss at various stages 
of animistic thinking will be summarized. Responses to 
the general questioning of the Questionnaire for Ss at 
various rated stages of animism on the Questionnaire were 
examined. A majority of Ss categorized as being in Stage 
0 answered the questions with irrelevant remarks, or said 
"I don't know". An example is "What does it mean (to 
be alive)?" "Bathing suits." "Give me the name of some 
things which are alive." "Houses, paper." This S pro­
ceeded to say that an object was alive because it "likes 
to be alive."
Most Ss in Stages 1, 2, and 3 said they did not know 
what it meant to be alive. However, they responded 
correctly when asked to name some things which were 
living. Table XII indicates the number of Ss in each 
stage responding to the general questioning in each of 
5 ways.
Table XII reveals that although there is some cor­
respondence between a S's ability to give a reasonably
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TABLE XII
FREQUENCY OF Ss IN EACH STAGE RESPONDING TO THE 
GENERAL QUESTIONS OF THE QUESTIONNAIRE 
IN FIVE CLASSIFIABLE WAYS
Stages
0 1 2 3
No comprehension 9 3 1 0
Replied "I don't know"* 
but named inanimate 
objects ** 3 0 0 0
Replied "I don't know"* 
but named both 
inanimate and animate 
objects ** 1 1 0 0
Replied "I don't know"* 
but named animate 
objects ** 6 12 9 8
Gave a reasonably 
correct explanation + 0 2 3 2
* to the questions "Do you know what it is to be alive, 
to be living?" and "What does it mean?"
** when asked "Give me the name of some things which are 
alive."
+ "reasonably correct explanation" included mention of 
any of the biological traits of aliveness, such as 
"eats", "grows", etc.
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correct explanation of what it means to be alive and his 
actual attribution of aliveness to objects, caution is 
needed in seeking clues to cognitive development in 
young children.
Several examinations of the data were made to inves­
tigate what criteria Ss used in attributing life. An 
inspection of the response content to the test items of 
the Questionnaire provided some insight into the hypo­
thetical rationales Ss utilized in making their decisions. 
Protocols were categorized as being primarily in one of 
three groups: (1) no comprehension, (2) use of superfi­
cial characteristics of the object, and (3) use of a 
functional characteristic. The frequencies by age 
groups for each of these groupings are shown in Table XIII.
TABLE XIII
FREQUENCIES BY AGE GROUP OF QUESTIONNAIRE 
PROTOCOLS IN EACH OF THREE GROUPINGS 









3-year-olds 11 3 6
4-year-olds 4 2 13
5-year-olds 2 0 17
Two of the protocols exhibited approximately equal 
portions of 2 or more groupings and thus were not
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included in Table XIII. Very few of the protocols were 
entirely within the definition of one grouping. However, 
the majority of responses in each protocol used 1 type 
of rationale.
In the No Comprehension group some of the £s said
"I don't know" or refused to answer. Other responses
placed in this category included "because it likes to be 
alive", and "because my mom said (it is alive)."
As can be seen in Table XIII, few Ss utilized the
superficial characteristics of an object to decide if it 
was alive or not. This category included such responses 
as "it has no feet", "because it is out there", and 
"because it is yellow". Another type of response given 
several times appears to be superficial: "when we open
a light it is alive and when we close it, it's not 
alive". This £  is exhibiting the idea that movement is 
crucial; when something is moving (or is performing a 
function) it is alive (of value to us), but when it is 
not moving or performing a useful function it is not 
alive. This reasoning, in the Piagetian view, arises 
from the eogcentricity of the child's thinking. He is 
the center of the universe and all other objects are 
there to serve him.
Included in the functional grouping of responses to 
the question "why do you say it is alive?" are comments 
on the moral as well as physical attributes of objects. 
Examples of this type of reasoning are "because it can
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function) it is alive (of value to us), but when it is 
not moving or performing a useful function it is not 
alive. This reasoning, in the Piagetian view, arises 
from the eogcentricity of the child's thinking. He is 
the center of the universe and all other objects are 
there to serve him.
Included in the functional grouping of responses to 
the question "why do you say it is alive?" are comments 
on the moral as well as physical attributes of objects. 
Examples of this type of reasoning are "because it can
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fly", "because it can rain-drop", "because people can go 
up the mountain", and "because it can snap you". Again, 
in this group we see responses indicating that the value of 
an object can determine its aliveness.
Frequently an £  using functional characteristics for 
most items would refer to superficial characteristics in 
attributing life to a few objects. £  #37 said the bell 
was alive "because it rings", the airplane, "because it 
flies in the sky", the tree, "because it has a stem like 
this (gesturing)", and the mountain, "because it has lots 
of dirt". Other children used relevant functions of 
objects to attribute life and employed superficial char­
acteristics of other objects in explaining why they were 
not alive. £  #47, for example, said a bird was alive 
"because it can fly", whereas a tree was not alive "because 
it has leaves on it" and a mountain was not"because there's 
dirt on it".
Another £  imparted "will" and a sense of freedom to 
objects: many things were called alive because they "can
go wherever they want to" or "you can ride them wherever 
you want to".
For some older £s, having a function is necessary but 
not sufficient for life. Subjects often discriminated 
among possible functions, accepting some and discarding 
others as criteria for granting aliveness. One £  said a 
tree was alive "because it grows", whereas the wind is
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not alive "because it's just wind. . . it blows". This 
same S said a bird is alive because "it brings good luck".
Even though responses to the Questionnaire items lent 
themselves to a degree of content categorization, this 
author is still impressed with the highly individualistic 
rationales Ss utilized in the attribution or denial of 
life.
Further evidence regarding the basis for animism 
comes from an analysis of responses to the Story Inquiry 
items. Piaget said that children consider objects to 
act intentionally. Objects on the Story Inquiry which 
elicited 53 responses indicating intentional activity 
also obtained 39 responses indicating attribution of life. 
The older £s showed a marked decrease in the tendency to 
call an action intentional, correctly perceiving the 
stories as depicting accidental situations. It is 
interesting to note, however, that 55 Ss attributed blame 
or fault at least once in the 3 stories. Many of the 
younger £[s found both participants at fault. Likewise,
Ss of all ages stated that punishment should be adminis­
tered in 85 instances, 57 of these involving objects 
which the £  also called alive on the same task. Only 14 
Ss who laid blame for an action failed to indicate 
punishment was in order in at least 1 of the stories. So, 
it seems that regardless of whether an object acted 
intentionally, punishment for the deed was often called 
for, even by the older Ss.
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After indicating that one of the inanimate objects 
"knew” what had happened in a story, many of the younger 
Ss responded to the additional query with a comment on 
the function of that object. For example, when asked how 
the sun felt about what had happened, one £  replied "it 
burns you". Older Ss were able to speak in terms of 
emotion, such as "feels mad", or "feels badly", or "he's 
sad".
To focus on a specific hypothetical criterion S>s 
might use to attribute life, the Card Sort data were ana­
lyzed in several ways. The association between movement 
and aliveness was evaluated by tabulating instances where 
Ss attributed both movement and aliveness to 22 inanimate 
Card Sort items. Also tallied were occurrences of an item 
being labeled "alive and no movement", "not alive and no 
movement", and "not alive and movement". The percentages 
of each type of occurrence are presented by age group in 
Figure 1.
It is evident from Figure 1 that 3-year-olds called 
more inanimate objects alive, regardless of whether move­
ment was also attributed. With increasing age there was 
a decreasing tendency to call something alive unless it 
also moved. However, S were more likely, with increasing 
age, to attribute movement but not aliveness to inanimate 
objects. The picture of this phenomenon is remarkably 
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aliveness for younger Ss, but is a less critical determi­
nant for older £s.
Four of the 22 inanimate objects on the Card Sort 
were broken or smashed. These items were the dish, 
tricycle, glasses, and pnecil, and were included in the 
task to test an hypothesis of differential responding to 
these items as compared with objects in good physical 
condition. The percentage of Ss by age group placing 
broken objects as opposed to non-broken objects in the 
combinations of the alive and movement categories are 
presented in Table XIV.
TABLE XIV
PERCENTAGE OF Ss BY AGE GROUPS CLASSIFYING 
BROKEN AND NON-BROKEN INANIMATE CARD SORT 
OBJECTS WITH RESPECT TO THE CATEGORIES 















Alive-Movement 30 37 7 15 2 13
Not Alive -No 
Movement 31 24 54 39 75 41
Alive-No Movement 30 24 24 24 10 9
Not Alive- 
Movement 9 14 15 22 13 37
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Table XIV reveals that the joint attribution of not 
alive-no movement was strikingly differential for broken 
objects as compared to intact objects. Although the 
difference is small with the 3-year-olds, 4-and especially 
5-year-olds demonstrated a marked tendency to identify the 
broken objects as unable to move and not alive.
With the exception of analyses dealing with intra­
subject consistency, little has been reported to this 
point about Ss' performance on items presenting living 
objects. The Card Sort data is representative of the way 
Ss perceived animate objects as tested in the present 
study.
Performances of Ss with regard to the 9 animate 
objects on the Card Sort in relation to aliveness and 
movement are presented in Table XV. .
TABLE XV
FREQUENCIES AND PERCENTAGES OF INSTANCES 
Ss BY AGE GROUP PLACED ANIMATE OBJECTS 
ON THE CARD SORT INTO ALIVE AND MOVEMENT CATEGORIES
Age Group
3-year-olds 4-year-olds 5-year-olds 
Category Pair Freq. % Freq. % Preq. %
Alive-Movement 98 54 118 66 128 71
Not Alive-No 
Movement 17 9 20 11 16 9
Alive-No Movement 23 13 26 14 24 13
Not Alive-Movement 42 23 16 9 12 7
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These data indicate that with increasing age there 
developed an improved ability to correctly discriminate 
animate objects as being alive and capable of movement. 
With increasing age is also seen a declining in responses 
labeling something not alive that was perceived as able 
to move. The joint category of not alive-no movement is 
of special interest: 47 out of 53 responses from all £s 
in this category dealt with the flower or the tree. In 
general, the picture is reversed for animate and inanimate 
objects: there was a decreasing tendency with age to
call an inanimate object alive and capable of movement, 
whereas there was an increasing tendency to attribute 
life and movement to animate objects. And, more Ss, with 
increasing age, attributed movement but not life to non­
living objects, but reversed this tendency for animate 
objects.
A final analysis of the Card Sort data was completed 
to examine whether there was a greater association between 
aliveness and autonomous movement as opposed to aliveness 
and movement, regardless of the source. Figure 2 presents 
the placement of 22 inanimate Card Sort objects for the 
categories of autonomous movement and aliveness. Separat­
ing the data by age groups enables an inspection of the 
effect of age on this association. Figure 2 shows that 
3-year-olds associated aliveness with autonomous movement 
to a remarkable degree. In part, this association may 
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by at least 3 Ss. A more meaningful distribution is found 
among the 4- and 5-year olds. The first 2 bars of each 
age group indicate a substantial amount of association 
between aliveness and autonomous movement. The last 
bar, that of "not alive-autonomous movement" is somewhat 
surprising. This suggests Ss might be willing to attri­
bute life-like qualities to objects but would stop short 
of attributing life itself. This, of course, is also 
true of adults: witness our use of animism by poetic
license in everyday speech. A comparison of Figures 1 and 
2 indicates that, with increasing age, the changes in fre­
quencies of all categories are in the same direction.
That is, there is a decreasing tendency to attribute life 
to an inanimate object unless it is additionally capable 
of movement or autonomous movement. At the same time, 
however, £s exhibit an increasing willingness to grant 
movement of either kind without also attributing life.
DISCUSSION
Investigations into the nature of the child's con­
ception of aliveness have raised a number of issues.
Among the debated topics are (1) the reality of the con­
cept of animism: is the thinking of the child qualitative­
ly different from that of the adult?, (2) the stage con­
cept: does the development of non-animistic thought
occur in a series of recognizable stages?, (3) task 
equivalence: is animism merely an artifact of the
experimental situation typically used for its measurement?, 
(4) evidence regarding the existence of animism: what
behaviors constitute animism? What effect does grouped 
as opposed to individual item analysis have on the 
amount of animism judged to be present?, and (5) the 
basis of animism: what attributes does the child use in
designating animate and inanimate objects alive or not 
alive?
The present study has provided information on each 
of these issues. The discussion which follows involves 
an overlapping of issues and evidence as each topic is 
interwoven with the others.
Animism as a Construct
One line of thinking about animism, following Piagets 
original formulation, regards animistic thinking as a
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useful description of a process of congitive development. 
The other, proposed by Huang and others, maintains that 
there is no unique state of precausal thinking in the 
young child. The Piagetian regards the young child as 
fusing the two worls of himself and external reality, 
resulting in total egocentrism. Gradually, the character­
istics of these two worlds become differentiated and 
notions about each develop which replace earlier thoughts. 
Thus, child thought is seen to be qualitatively different 
from that of the adult.
Those opposing the reality of animism hold that 
instead of an elaborate set of precausal ideation, a 
neutral or undetermined state exists, characterized by 
a lack of ideas about the nature of the self or the 
world. Then gradually, as more information is accumulated, 
the child approaches adult thought, a quantitative 
process (Huang, 1943; Klingberg, 1957). In support of 
the notion of the existence of a state of ignorance,
Huang (1943) claimed that young children answer at random 
and frequently change their responses when new suggestions 
are made.
The present study provides information on both quali­
tative and quantitative differences with age. In general, 
quantitative measures include numerical tabulation of 
animistic errors, i.e., attributing life to inanimate 
objects. Qualitative indices involve the reasoning
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behind such decisions, the ideational process underlying 
the labeling of objects as alive or not alive.
Although the current research did not directly com­
pare child and adult thinking, age trends were found that 
could be theoretically extrapolated. Support for extra­
polation is provided by significant correlations between 
rankings of identical Questionnaire items used in this 
research and Laurendeau and Pinard's (1962) study with 
Ss through 12 years of age.
Analyses indicating quantitative differences among 
Ss in the current research utilized the frequencies of 
animistic errors by age groups for individual items, and 
within each of the three tasks.
Both measures showed decreases in animism with in­
creasing age. The tabulation of animistic errors for 
individual items on each of the three tasks revealed that 
3-year-olds consistently called more inanimate objects 
alive more often than 4-or 5-year-olds. Huang and other 
opponents of the precausality notion have reported that 
individual item analysis failed to exhibit signs of ani­
mism. Their analysis was conducted in a manner similar 
to the individual item analyses carried out in the 
present study. The ranges of animistic errors for £s 
in this research show that every age group called each 
inanimate object alive some of the time. The percentages 
for the 3-year-olds were higher than the 4-and 5-year-
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olds on all three tasks. The evidence suggests some 
animistic thinking is present at all age levels sampled.
The second quantitative measure employed animism 
scores assigned to Ss for each of the three tasks. Ana­
lyses of variance using these scores indicated that age 
was the only significant factor in accounting for dif­
ferences in performances on each of the three tasks. The 
finding of no differential response between boys and girls 
is in agreement with previous studies (Russell, 1940a).
Qualitative differences are exhibited in the ration­
ales Ss used to call inanimate objects alive. In general, 
younger Ss often relied on capricious reasons while older 
Ss developed an awareness of the movement of objects 
and, further, of autonomous energy. At the oldest age 
levels in this study there is evidence of the beginning 
of an adult biological definition of life, such as "it 
breathes, eats", etc.
Qualitative differences over age were indicated by 
the stages of animism assigned on the basis of Question­
naire and Card Sort data. Stages for the Questionnaire 
were assigned by a standardized qualitative analysis of 
response content. As might be expected, higher cognitive 
levels were found more frequently for older children.
Other qualitative differences were shown by the 
kinds of object characteristics mentioned by the child. 
With increasing age fewer Ss used capricious reasons or
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superficial characteristics to label an object alive, 
whereas the use of functional characteristics increased.
Analyses of the Story Inquiry data indicated younger 
£s attributed intention to objects more often than older 
Ss, sometimes blaming both participants of the story.
This supports Piaget's theory of egocentricism, whereby 
the young child cannot conceive of unconscious action.
Age differences were found in the association of 
aliveness and movement, determined by performance on the 
Card Sort. There is a decreasing tendency to attribute 
life to an inanimate object unless it is additionally 
capable of movement. At the same time, however, Ss ex­
hibit an increasing willingness to grant movement without 
also attributing life.
Both quantitative and qualitative measures strength­
ened the notion that fewer inanimate objects are called 
alive with increasing age, an hypothesis generally sup­
ported by all previous investigations regardless of 
theoretical persuasion of the experimenter. Characteris­
tics of objects which young children initially used in 
decision making changed with increasing age. This change 
was such that the two characteristics could not be 
simultaneously applied, thus a qualitative shift had 
occurred.
The picture of the young child's mind existing in 
ignorance or in a void of some type fails to provide a 
useful alternative to Piaget's theory of indifferentiation,
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as pointed out by Jahoda (1958a). Although both quantita­
tive and qualitative change theories are tenable, looking 
at the "why's" of the child's responses appears more pro­
ductive in analyzing the process of cognitive development.
The Stage Concept
Pertinent to the above discussion of qualitative and 
quantitative differences between child and adult thought 
is the notion of stages as descriptive of the growth 
process. Theories which deny the existence of animistic 
thought contend that children progress from a state of 
relative ignorance to one of better and better knowledge. 
Empirical proof for this incremental process seems out 
of reach. The positive view of animism hypothesizes that 
growth occurs in recognizable stages, each stage being a 
transformation of previous stages rather than a simple 
incorporation of additional concepts.
Information gained from the perspective of direct 
observation of children enabled Piaget to categorize the 
development of the concept of aliveness into four stages. 
These were redefined by Laurendeau and Pinard (1962) and 
their stages were employed in the present study. Stage 0 
includes Ss who show no comprehension of the concept for 
various reasons. Stage 1 £s appear to use such criteria 
as whether an object is in good condition, can be used 
for some purpose, is capable of movement, or has some 
traits typically associated with humans. Stage 2 is one 
of transition, where Ss employ the idea of autonomous
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movement as the criterial variable. Stage 3 is marked 
by the total disappearance of animistic thought, where 
no inanimate objects are called alive.
Included in the theory that questions the existence 
of animism is the challenge that if it does indeed exist, 
then all 3-year-old children should exhibit signs of 
being completely animistic, that is, calling all inanimate 
objects alive all of the time. If this does not occur, 
according to this line of reasoning, then the existence 
of animistic thought has not been proven. This theoreti­
cal stance seems untenable. Although Piaget set age ranges 
for his stages of animism, he carefully noted that these 
were approximations only, that not all 3 year-olds neces­
sarily would be in Stage 0 or 1. Stages of physical 
development certainly do not occur at the same time for 
every child. Piaget would hypothesize, however, that 
each child goes through the stages of animism sequentially, 
albeit at varying speeds as compared with other children.
In the present study Ss were classified into one 
of four stages of animism on the basis of Questionnaire 
data. Further, reasonable correspondence was achieved 
between rated stages on the Questionnaire and on the Card 
Sort, the classification system being applied to that 
task as well. Although longitudinal studies involving 
repeated measurement of the same £  over time would 
provide conclusive evidence regarding sequential con­
stancy of stages, the present study found that the
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frequency of £s in the higher stages of animism increased 
with age.
An indication of the validity of the stages in terms 
of a more general concept of aliveness was demonstrated 
in relating performance on the general questioning of 
the Questionnaire task to the rated stage of animism. A 
majority of the Ss were unable to give an explanation of 
what it meant to be alive, but correctly named some things 
that were alive. Of this group of Ss, most were classi­
fied in Stages 1, 2, or 3. It appears, therefore, that 
the ability to express a general concept of what it is to 
be alive seldom occurs before age 6. However, the results 
do not mean that all children below this are uniformly ani­
mistic or non-animistic. Rather, there occur gradations 
of response patterns reflecting specific levels of cog­
nitive operation definable by criteria peculiar to each 
stage.
Incremental growth could be described as the incorpora­
tion of "bits" of information much like computer theory 
(Safier, 1964). These "bits", presumably, would be 
specific instances, such as "a chair is not alive". Any­
thing more generalizable would approach a stage theory, 
where concept formation would be described as the vehicle 
of change. Therefore, if growth were incremental, the 
possibility of being able to reliably classify 60 Ss into 
four stages of animism characterized by specific criteria, 
but not specific instances, would seem to be remote. In
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sum, evidence from the present study would support the 
developmental sequence of discrete stages as being the 
most parsimonious explanation of behavior at this point 
in the investigation of animism.
Task Equivalence
Some investigators have argued that the concept of 
animism is not useful in describing cognitive growth.
They claim that the artificial nature of the experimental 
situation typically used to measure animism has instead 
created the tendency for young children to give non- 
naturalistic answers. The Questionnaire technique em­
ployed by Piaget has been criticized by Huang and others 
on the ground that verbal techniques used with young 
children are difficult to evaluate. The latter research­
ers argue that if enough leading questions are pursued, 
a child is likely to give some animistic answers.
In order to test the validity of this argument, 
three tasks were employed in the present study; one of 
these was the standardized verbal questionnaire test. Two 
additional tests were used that dealt with many of the same 
items in more concrete forms. In all three tasks the £  
was asked "Is the alive?", thus controlling the
semantic factor discussed by Looft and Bartz (1969). It 
was hypothesized that as an object changes from verbal, 
to pictorial, to life-like model presentations, one could 
safely assume that the child would share an increased 
knowledge of the object. Therefore, if children exhibit
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marked animism on the Questionnaire (verbal stimuli) but 
less on the Card Sort (pictorial presentations), and even 
less on a Story Inquiry task (life-like models), then the 
claim of Huang and associates that animism is but an 
artifact of the experimental situation would be sup­
ported.
The present study revealed a moderate degree of con­
sistency of responses to identical objects presented in 
three forms. Animism scores for each task were positively 
correlated, and there was significant intra-subject agree­
ment on a majority of items across paired tasks. There 
was no difference in the proportion of total Ss calling 
each of four objects alive on all three tasks, indicating 
task equivalence. Furthermore, classification of Ss on 
Questionnaire protocols into one of four stages of animism 
were found to be closely related to the stages in which 
they were placed on the Card Sort task. Finally, the 
impression of the writer confirms the statistical findings. 
The writer was continually impressed with the strength of 
the child's convictions; each Ŝ conveyed an individualis­
tic opinion about the life of objects and held to it 
doggedly across all three experimental tasks. Admittedly, 
there was no direct attempt to persuade Ss to change 
their opinions. However, if responses had been random 
or without adherence to a general conceptual framework, 
it would seem that the repeated question "Is the _____
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alive?" would have yielded markedly different results 
over the three tasks.
Two sources of evidence from the current research 
supported the contention that verbal presentation of 
the stimuli contributes to the presence of animism. The 
first involves analyzing the effect the degree of ab­
straction of the stimuli had on the elicitation of ani­
mistic responses. More 3-year-olds than 4-or 5-year- 
olds called an inanimate object "alive" on the Question­
naire and then denied life to the same object on the Card 
Sort and/or the Story Inquiry. The frequency differences 
by age groups were not statistically significant, but 
the trend was in the expected direction, i.e., the con­
creteness of the stimulus form appeared to have a dif­
ferential effect for younger Ss.
One other finding lends credence to the assertion 
that verbal presentation of the stimuli facilitates ani­
mism. The frequencies of Ss calling individual objects 
"alive" on the Questionnaire (verbal) task were slightly 
higher than the frequencies for the Card Sort (pictorial) 
and the Story Inquiry (model presentation). This was 
true especially for the 3-year-olds, although, again, 
the difference is not statistically significant.
From the accumulation of data in the present study 
it would appear that little difference in the manifesta­
tion of animism could be attributed to differences in
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stimulus presentation, provided other variables of the 
experimental stiuation are held constant.
What Constitutes Animism?
Several decisions face the experimenter in the in­
vestigation of animism. These include deciding what 
behaviors constitute the expression of animism and how 
to analyze these behaviors once the research is completed. 
The former involves the operational definition of animism, 
a major source of disagreement as illustrated in an 
earlier section of this paper. Huang (1943) and Klingberg 
(1957) have attacked those who would include such com­
plicated concepts as growth, birth, reproduction, meta­
bolism, and moral conscience in the child's attribution 
of "life" to an inanimate object. Although the semantic
problem of what the question "Is the _____ alive?" actually
means was not directly tested in the present research, 
data from the Story Inquiry task contributes some insight 
into related concepts, such as intention of action, 
feelings of guilt, the attribution of blame, and the need 
for punishment. Generally, the data indicated that for 
inanimate objects called "alive" there was a tendency to 
also attribute intention, blame, and the need for punish­
ment. These trends were not statistically evaluate 
and the frequencies of each, except for the need for 
punishment, were higher among the younger Ss. Feelings 
of guilt or upset were found with the older Ss, the younger 
Ss frequently describing a characteristic of the object
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rather than conveying a feeling tone. Therefore, 
although the data from the current study is inconclusive, 
it does appear that some of the composite traits of 
"aliveness" are included in the child's concept of life.
The methods of data analysis have led to confusion 
in comparing the results of several studies of animism. 
Previous studies substantiating the presence of animism 
have analyzed results in terms of the number of £s ex­
hibiting at least one animistic response during the 
experimental procedure (grouped data). Investigators 
embracing the view that there is not a reliably different 
process operating in children have utilized individual 
data analysis, whereby each item is scored in terms of 
the number of children reacting animistically to it.
The problem thus appears one of measuring internal ani­
mistic consistency within Ss or within items. In addition, 
there is the problem of deciding "how many" non-natura- 
listic responses must be observed, regardless of the man­
ner in which it is measured, to constitute animism. These 
decisions appeared to have been answered in previous 
research according to theoretical persuasion; the present 
study utilized both methods of analyzing the data.
Intra-subject consistency for animism was exhibited 
in the reliable classification of Ss into four stages of 
animism on the basis of Questionnaire data. This con­
sistency within Ss across tasks is expressed in the 
intercorrelations of animism scores for the three tasks
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and the moderate degree of correspondence between stages 
assigned on the Questionnaire and the Card Sort.
Analyzing responses to individual items on each of 
the three tasks revealed that the average percentages of 
Ss calling inanimate objects alive ranged from 30% to 
60%. The question then becomes one of setting a cut-off 
point, e.g., all items being called alive at least 50% of 
the time should be evidence of animism. Huang and his 
associates interpreted Piaget's theory as meaning that 
100% of the children in the first stage of animism would 
call 100% of the inanimate objects alive 100% of the 
time. As discussed in an earlier paragraph, this was a 
misinterpretation of the theory. Therefore, when Huang 
and other opponents of the precausal notion reported that 
their research failed to substantiate the existence of 
animism, the above criteria were being employed.
Experience gained from the present research revealed 
that Ss in the same stage of animism would call different 
inanimate objects alive and for different reasons, al­
though the general rationale expressed was similar as 
defined by the criteria for that particular stage. For 
that reason, individual item analysis would have an 
attenuating statistical effect and create a tendency to 
ignore the basis for the behavior.
The Basis of Animism
Beyond the methodological considerations discussed 
above lies the theoretical schema of "aliveness" for
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the child: what criteria serve to discriminate between
objects called alive and not alive?
The developmental sequence of these criteria are 
reflected in the stages of animism. To investigate 
whether physical characteristics of objects determined 
their "aliveness", the Questionnaire protocols were group­
ed into three categories on the basis of the characteris­
tics of the objects used by the Ss. Excluding the £s 
who exhibited no comprehension of the concept, it was 
found that only a few Ss used superficial characteristics 
of the objects and most employed functional traits in 
making their decisions. For younger Ss, movement was 
found to be important, as was the service value of an 
object to people, and whether it was in usable condition. 
Older £s discriminated between functions, accepting some 
and rejecting others as prerequisite for life. Data 
from the Card Sort task indicated that older Ss more 
easily identified broken items as not capable of move­
ment and not alive. This is in agreement with the notion 
that children discriminate between damaged and whole ob­
jects in attributing life (Russell & Dennis, 1939).
The stages of animism described by Laurendeau and 
Pinard (1962) hypothesize movement as a criterial variable 
for assessing aliveness. The Card Sort task in the 
present study was designed to ascertain the association 
between mover.ent and aliveness. The results indicated a 
close relationship between the ability of an object to
move and the probability that it would be called alive.
It is interesting to note that older Ss were more willing 
than younger Ss to grant movement to objects correctly 
labeled not alive. Trends in the same direction were 
found for the categories of autonomous movement and 
aliveness. It is impossible to tell whether the tendency 
to attribute autonomous movement but not life to inani­
mate objects is expressing the beginning of poetic 
license as used by adults, the lack of understanding by 
the Ss of autonomous movement as expressed in the task, 
or the lack of relationship between autonomous movement 
and aliveness for the £s.
Further clues regarding the concept of life are 
expressed in Ss' performance on Card Sort items depicting 
animate objects. Subjects characterized by animism stage 
as being non-animistic continued to deny life to some 
living objects, particularly the tree and flower. These 
results substantiate earlier findings that plant life 
is often called "not alive" because of the absence of 
anthropomorphic traits (Laurendeau & Pinard, 196 2; Huang 
& Lee, 1945).
Evidence from the present study substantiate earlier 
theoretical schemas regarding the basis of animism set 
forth by Piaget and his supporters. Young children ap­
pear to place central value on the ability of an object 
to perform a function in discriminating between "alive" 
and "not alive". In performing a function an object is
usually perceived as capable of movement, either imparted 
or autonomous. The criteria may appear blended with one 
another and employed interchangably as the child approaches 
the concept of living held by educated adults of his 
society. And yet, although the total process may seem to 
be a blending of criteria, most Ss in the current research 
utilized one predominant criterion for most items. It 
is interesting to note that very few £s hesitated in 
stating why something was alive, the expression of their 
opinion conveying a feeling of certainity. This is in 
contrast to Huang's (1943) assertion that children answer 
at random and can be easily swayed in their opinions.
Although the characteristics of an object might 
determine the particular words used by an Ŝ, results of 
the current study employing three tasks suggest that the 
general conceptual level telescopes S's thinking initially 
upon the presentation of a stimulus. One must recognize, 
however, that two stimulus items which differ only in the 
degree of abstraction inherent in them might well serve 
to focus the child differentially in his often transitory 
stage of conceptual development. This stage might be 
conceptualized as a bounded figure rather than a point in 
cognitive space; a child could conceivably maneuver along 
this continuum, with the upper end leading toward a 
higher conceptual level, being approached and overtaken 
in a series of ever-nearing sweeps, much like a pendulum 
attached to a slowly moving conveyor belt. Encounters
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with situations along the way would cause the pendulum to 
swing, meeting with the most economical rectification of 
present stimuli with past experiences. Needless to say, 
this progression would not inevitably be in a forward 
direction, thus the backslides and failures which continue 
to occur even when the new concept appears to have been 
mastered. This description is similar to Piaget's con­
cept of equilibration which holds that the organism is 
always striving towards a state of equilibrium. The 
process of changing from state to state is termed equili­
bration, with the additional processes of assimiliation 
and accommodation serving to incorporate new situations 
or concepts (Phillips, 1969).
The single most impressive result gleaned from data 
in this study has been the consistency of 3-7 4- and 5-year- 
olds in conveying their concepts of aliveness. To be 
sure, there were intra-subject disagreements, but a 
majority of Ss were markedly consistent. The three tasks 
were found to be reliable and valid instruments for the 
measurement of animism. Data from these procedures were 
analyzed with the optimal statistical techniques available, 
the results indicating that, by groups and individually,
Ss could be categorized as possessing varying amounts 
of animism.
In summary, analyses of the responses to the three 
tasks in the present research generally support the 
dewcription of the developmental sequence of animism
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posited by Piaget and refined by Laurendeau and Pinard 
(1962). New directions suggested by Looft and Bartz 
(1969) were initiated in the present study and found to 
have close correspondence with traditional methods used. 
Therefore, the door is opened to pursue more rigorously 





















INSTRUCTIONS TO JUDGES FOR ASSIGNING 
ANIMISM STAGES ON THE BASIS 
OF QUESTIONNAIRE RESPONSES
INSTRUCTIONS
Please consider each Questionnaire protocol indepen­
dently. Each one should be judged by the following 
criteria. Those items marked with an X have been scored 
as answered incorrectly, i.e., inanimate objects were 
labeled as being alive by the S_. Consider all answers in 
determining the stage of animism. Please read the cri­
teria carefully, and ask me any questions you might have 
before starting the judgments. Enter the stage next to 
the S's number on the tally sheet.
Stage 0: Incomprehension or refusal. This stage 
comprises those iSs who could not understand the questions 
or answered at random without ever giving valid explana­
tions. An example of this type is the following:
Age 4:6: "You know what it is to be alive? What
does it mean? .1 don*t know. Is a mountain alive?
 No.  Why do you say it is not alive?---
Because it is sand. The sun? Yes. Why?---
It*s warm wKen the sun is there. An automobile?
 No.-- Why?-— Because~i’t ls not alive. The table?
 Yes•-- Why? Because it's alive.---A cat?---
Yes.-- Why? It says ymeeow* .-:— A cloud? No. 
why?-- It's a slcy, a cloud. " (Laurendeau & Pinard,
1962, p T T T l T . --------
Often a subject in Stage 0 will use the same reason 
to attribute and deny life to objects, thus illustrating 
his ignorance of logical operations. This results in
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contradictions in the protocol, typical of infantile, 
prelogical thinking. The child's "yes's" and "no's" often 
seem to be independent of his explanations. Another 
example of Stage 0 thinking:
Age 6:0: "you know what it is to be alive? Yes.
 What does it mean? To be born.Give me the name,
tell me some thing w h i chTs alive. Animals.---
A mountain?-- No.---Why?---1̂ know it. The sun?----
N o .---- Why? Because IE know it.-The table?---
No. Why? 1 know "it. An automobile? N o .---
wKy?---- It. runs. A cat? Yes.-Why? We often see
some cats. A cloud?---Yes. Why? Because I_ say
so. A lamp? No.---Why? Because it's not alive.
 A watch?-- No.---Why?---Because it runs. A
bird? Yes. Why? Because it lilies in~the air.
 A bell? No. Why? Because I_ know it. The
wind? No. Why? Because it*s something cold and
does not run. An airplane? No.-■— why?---Because
it flies in the air like birds. A fly? Yes.---
Why? Because it flies in the air." (Ibid, p. 142).
Stage 1: Animistic thinking based upon usefulness,
anthropomorphism, or movement.
Subjects in this stage commit errors of the animistic 
type by attributing life to one or many inanimate objects. 
These £3s use criteria which are imperfect, but the authors 
remark on the consistency of the child's thinking. "He 
never resorts to the same reason to attribute or refuse 
life" (Ibid, p. 145). Frequently a combination of two 
or even three of these criteria can be seen in explanations. 
Some children may refuse life to plants and trees by 
reason that they do not move, or are perceived by the 
child to be immobile. An example of this stage is:
Age 4:6: "You know what it is to be alive? No.
 What does it mean? I don't know. Is a
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mountain alive? No. Why do you say that it is
not alivev It does not have a mouth. The sun?
 Yes. Why? I_t has a moutE. — -The table?---
No. Why? It does not have a mouth. An auto­
mobile? Yes. Why? It has wheels. A cat?---
Yes. Why? rt has mouth's. A cloud? Yes.---
Why? It has mouths since it rains. The wind?---
Yes. Why? It has mouths; it blows." (Ibid, p.145).
Stage 2: Autonomous movement with some residual
animistic thinking.
This stage, characterized as one of transition, is 
distinguished from Stage 1 by the discovery of two dis­
tinct sources of movement. Only one of these, that is, 
where the source of the movement is the object itself, now 
serves as a criterion for life. Laurendeau and Pinard 
discuss how this criterion alone does not serve to cause 
the total disappearance of animism. Most importantly, 
children continue for some time to delude themselves as 
to the real source of movement, particularly with regard 
to those objects most removed from direct experience, such 
as the wind, sun, moon, etc.
Another reason is that "the discovery of autonomous 
movement does not definitely displace the inadequate or 
imperfect criteria of the first stage. In fact, the most 
frequent occurrence is that the child relies upon autonomy 
to justify some, of his responses, but for the other 
responses still resorts frequently to usefulness of ob­
jects, to their possessing anthropomorphic traits, or to 
their general movement. All subjects of this stage, 
however, at least make mention of autonomous movement."
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(Ibid, p. 147). An example of Stage 2 thinking is:
Age 10:0: "What does it mean to be alive?  It
means that you can move about, play, that you can do
all kinds of things. Give me the name of some thing
which is aTTve.--- You.-- Is a mountain alive? 
Yes. Why?-- Because it has ^rown by itself.----The
sun? Yes.--why? Because it gives light.----The
table? No. Why? Because the tree-which was
used to make the table~~is dead. A cloud? -Yes.---
Why? Because it sends water on the earth.— -The
wind?— Yes.--wKy? Because it pushes things.----
The fire? No.--- Why?-- Because it cannot light up
by itself." Tlbid, p. 148TI
Stage 3: Total disappearance of animistic thinking.
Subjects in this stage never grant life to inanimate 
objects, at least to those listed in the Questionnaire.
The reverse of this is not true, that is, Ss often refuse 
life to some animate objects, especially plants, on the 
basis of lack of autonomy and for anthropomorphic reasons. 
Explanations given may be anthropomorphic, or based on 
usefulness or activity. An example of this type of 
thinking i s :
Age 9:0: " . . .  A mountain?— — No. Why? It
doesn't walk, it always remains at the same place.
 The sun? No. Wny? I_t cannot move, it
remains at the same place. The table? No.---
Why? It cannot displace itself. An automobile?
 No.-- Why?---It needs a motor to make it run.---
A cat?-- Yes.---wEy? It can walFT A cloud?--- No .
 Why?-— It cannot displace itself. A lamp?---
No. Why? rt cannot walk by itself. A bird?---
Yes. Why? It can fly. A bell? No. Why?---
It needs a man to ring it. The fire? N o . Why?
 It does not displace-'itself as it wishes."
(Ibid, p. 15TF.
General remarks about classifying protocols: A
general rule of thumb is to determine the highest stage
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on each protocol, even though that criterion might have 
been mentioned only once. Characteristic of all stages 
is that imperfect criteria from preceding stages may also 
be present. No errors are necessary for a Stage 3 rating.
Except for item 1, the items are recorded on the 
answer sheet by numbers. The list of corresponding stimu­
lus items for these numbers are as follows:
1. mountain 13. car
2. table 14. cloud
3. cat 15. watch
4. lamp 16. bell
5. bird 17. airplane
6. wind 18. fire
7. fly 19. rain
8. flower 20. snake
9. tree 21. fish
10. bicycle 22. child (boy or girl, same
11. pencil sex as S)
12. sun 23. dog
Some common abbreviations I used during testing:
bee. or cau. = because
s.o. = someone
e.t. = everything, everytime
IDK = I don't know
w. = with
s.t. = something, sometime
a.t. = anything, anytime
s.b. = somebody
underlined consonant at end of word = add ’ing" to
word
arrow (-»•) = look on back of page for the rest
of the response 
£ = like(s) or look(s)
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